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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
"Technological change" by definition consists of two
major types:
(a) reduction of real costs per unit of output
(increasing productivity in resource use); and
(b) improvements in the quality and variety of
final consumption goods.
John W. Kendrick (1964) considered the "gains and losses" 
from technological change on two different levels. Firstly, the absolute 
gains and losses which accrue, on net balance, in the economy as a whole 
and its sectors. Secondly, relative gains and losses that accrue as a 
result of changes in relative prices of the various factors of production 
and intermediate inputs. The first type of gain or loss may be easily 
quantified, but relative gains and losses are much more difficult to 
quantify, since relative input prices change for reasons other than techno­
logical change and we have to attempt to separate out the relative price 
changes among the several causative factors.
Technological advance is reflected in net changes in total 
factor-productivity. Annual gains can be estimated by applying the 
average productivity of the previous year to the factors which are 
employed in a given year and subtract this from the net national product 
valued at the given year's prices. But as mentioned by Kendrick, "since 
annual productivity changes are influenced by changes in rates of utili­
sation of capacity, as well as changes in technology broadly defined,
2it would be better to compute productivity increments over longer 
periods of time which can be done by the same technique". In a 
similar fashion the total productivity increase can be assigned to 
all the original industries. So much work has been done on the abso­
lute level of productivity gains, but what about the distribution 
of the benefits and losses which are realised in the process; 
especially the earnings lost by those unemployed people whose dis­
placement may be traced to technological change?
Part of the costs of persons thrown out of employment on 
account of technological progress is borne by the community in the 
form of unemployment benefits. The employer may bear part of the cost 
in terms of redundancy payments, and the employee bears part of the 
costs in terms of income foregone. To what extent and in what manner 
should these costs be taken into account when assessing the impact of 
technological change?
As well as having the effect of increasing or decreasing 
the earnings potential of some labour, technological change can also 
increase or decrease the income earning potential of existing capital 
and land.
The extent to which these effects occur and the incidence 
with which they occur between firms must to a large extent be due to 
the investion and innovation capabilities of the entrepreneurs. The 
speed with which any "super-normal" profits are reduced will depend, 
among other things, upon the speed of diffusion of the innovation 
throughout the industry and on the extent of monopoly power over the
innovation possessed by firms.
3All of the important problems involved in answering the 
various questions implicit in the above statements about distribution 
have been barely touched upon in research in this area. This thesis 
sets out to review the progress made so far in looking at the benefits 
and costs of research and the distribution of these. The thesis 
points out a number of areas where further research is needed, and 
attempts to reconcile some of the differences which have arisen in 
the development of research techniques.
Organization of the Study
Measurement of total social gains from research is discussed 
in Chapter 2. Two issues are elaborated; one is sorting out the real 
supply shift due to a particular research program from other factors 
influencing supply. A second has to do with the type of supply shift. 
The Lindner-Jarrett discussion (1976) stresses the fact that research 
produced technology is not generally equally relevant to all producing 
environments and that this fact can affect the measurement of the supply 
shift. Two techniques which have been used for measuring the gains from 
research are discussed - the supply-shift method and the input-demand 
method. In the light of the analysis by Wisecarver (1974) of the 
validity of the answers provided by the supply-shift method, the con­
tinued use of this technique should be questioned. Chapter 3 considers 
the allocation of relative gains (losses) from research among producers 
and consumers, and the role of export markets. Chapter 4 presents the 
development of a generalized formulae for both consumers' surplus and 
producers' surplus, and discusses the various forms of these formulae 
used in empirical work and the different results given by each under
4the same circumstances. Chapter 5 deals with the allocation of 
the Producer gains (losses) from research among factors of production. 
It presents a number of serious criticisms of the much-quoted study 
by Schmitz and Seckler and offers possible directions for further 
work in this area. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
5CHAPTER 2
MEASUREMENT OF TOTAL SOCIAL GAINS FROM RESEARCH
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter the development of the two different 
techniques of analysing social gains (losses) generated from productivity- 
increasing research are reviewed. The two methods of estimation of 
social gains (losses) presented in this chapter are:
(i) the Supply-Shift method; and 
(ii) the Input-Demand method.
The first method measures social gains in terms of the 
output response to lowering the costs of production. The Input-Demand 
method measures the social gains from research by estimating the increase 
in the demand for that input whose productivity has been increased as 
a result of research.
Of those studies which have used the Supply-Shift method, 
some analyses have been inconsistent and some show a number of other 
problems in their use of this technique. These problems will be dis­
cussed in Section 2.2 in which those studies which have been mainly 
responsible for the development of the supply-shift method will be 
reviewed. In Section 2.3 the input-demand technique will be discussed.
In Section 2.4 the controversy over whether it is valid to use the 
product supply curve or the input-demand curve (to measure welfare 
gains from research) will be discussed by referring to the debate
between Schmalensee (1971) and Wisecarver (1974).
62.2 Supply-Shift Method
At the industry level, the effect of the adoption of a 
cost-reducing innovation can be represented diagrammatically by a 
downward shift of the supply curve. This means that more output can 
be produced at a given price, or the same output can be produced more 
cheaply. Economists now generally have agreed that the gross social 
benefits of the research which produces the innovation can be measured 
by the area between the two supply curves and below the demand curve.
In Fig. 1, S S represents industry supply curve in the absence ofo o
the innovation, and is the supply curve when the innovation is
adopted. The area to be measured is given by •
Although there is now general agreement about the area to 
be measured, the estimation methods used have varied greatly, and there 
has been a tendency to cover up the implications of the assumptions 
about the nature of the shift of the supply cruve.
2.2.1 Griliches1 Method
Let us start with Zvi Griliches (1958) and his path-breaking 
article on hybrid corn. By using the concepts of consumers and pro­
ducers surplus Griliches analysed two extreme cases: firstly, supply
is completely elastic and the original supply curve is S' (Fig. 2.1). 
After the development of hybrid corn, the new supply curve is S. Since 
supply is completely elastic, producers surplus does not exist and the 
net gain, A + B, represents the addition to consumer surplus. In other 
words, the "disappearance" of hybrid corn causes the supply curve to 
shift upward by the percentage reduction in the yield of corn. Thus,
7FIGURE 2.1
DOWNWARD SHIFT IN THE SUPPLY CURVE DUE TO ADOPTION 
OF COST-REDUCING INNOVATION
Quantity
FIGURE 2.2
UPWARD SHIFT IN THE PERFECTLY ELASTIC SUPPLY CURVE 
DUE TO THE "DISAPPEARANCE" OF HYBRID CORN
Quantity
9the "loss" to society, in this case is the total area under the demand 
curve and between the new and old supply curves, which is (A + B). 
Griliches considers the rectangle A as the increase in the total cost 
of producing the quantity in the new situation, and the triangle B 
as the loss in consumer's surplus caused by the rise in price. A linear 
approximation of the area (A + B) is given by the following formula:
Loss 1 = KP^Q^ (l-i^ Kri)
where,
K = % change in yield (marginal cost and average cost)
= previous equilibrium price of corn produced 
= previous equilibrium quantity of corn produced
T) = price elasticity of demand for corn
Secondly, he assumes that the elasticity of the supply 
curve is zero (Fig. 2.3). In this case, the loss should be measured by 
the area Ö2P2P1^1 o^r D + * T^e rectangel, F, measures the loss
is corn production at P^ which is the old price. The triangle, D, is 
the deadweight loss in economic welfare. C + D is the loss in consumer 
surplus. The total loss is given by the formula:
Loss 2 = KP Q (1+^Kn).
It is obvious that his second assumption leads to a higher 
estimation of the loss. R.K. Lindner and F.Q. Jarrett (1976) have shown 
that Griliches' claim that the "two estimates bracket estimates implied 
by assuming other intermediate supply elasticities" is not generally 
valid. They refer to the special case of a perfectly inelastic demand 
curve and a proportionate shift in the supply curve (Fig. 2.4), which
10
FIGURE 2.3
LEFTWARD SHIFT IN THE PERFECTLY INELASTIC SUPPLY CURVE 
DUE TO THE "DISAPPEARANCE" OF HYBRID CORN
q2 qx Quantity
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FIGURE 2.4
PROPORTIONATE SHIFT OF SUPPLY
P
Ao
p.1
A1
Ai
D Q = q
Source: R.K. Lindner and F.G. Jarrett (1976)
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implies that the reduction in average cost of production is greater at 
the margin than at intra-marginal levels of output.
They point out that an innovation of hybrid corn type is 
likely to result in a proportionate shift rather than a parallel shift 
in the supply curve because it is almost certain that the long-run corn 
supply curve will be less than perfectly elastic, and positive change 
in yields of hybrid corn may be relatively constant in all areas. If 
this is the case, Griliches' estimates of actual benefits could have 
been biased upwards.
Lindner and Jarrett have also shown that for a parallel 
shift of a partly elastic supply curve Griliches' formula under-estimates 
actual benefits when demand is not perfectly elastic, and that the error 
magnitude becomes larger as the demand curve elasticity increases. As 
a result, "Two biases operating in opposite directions will be intro­
duced by using Griliches' formula to estimate research benefits when 
both demand and supply are neither perfectly elastic, nor perfectly 
inelastic. It is therefore not possible a priori to reach a definite 
conclusion about whether Griliches has over-estimated the returns to 
hybrid corn research.".
Griliches' formula for calculating research benefits is 
given by: loss^ = KP^Q^(1-^Kp) , in which the supply function is assumed
to be perfectly elastic. Lindner and Jarrett believe (from Griliches' 
formula) that "research benefits could in principle be negative", i.e., 
when K and p (absolute value of r|) become large, then ^Kp > 1. When 
p = 0 (denoting a perfectly inelastic demand curve), the formula will
13
be reduced to KP^Q^. This KP^Q^ actually measures the area P^M M^P^
in Fig. 2.4. Now, we should refer to W. Clayton Dodge (1972) for the
Law of Parallelograms, which says "the area of any parallelogram is
equal to that of a rectangle with the same base and altitude". Thus,
taking this Theorem into account, the area P M M,P„ is equal to theo o 1 1
area A M M..A *. According to Lindner and Jarrett, since the area o o 1 1
AqMqM^A^* would represent the level of research benefits for a parallel 
downward shift of the supply curve, the above formula will over-estimate 
these benefits (by the triangle A^M^A^* in Fig. 2.4) whenever the absolute 
fall in average costs of production is greater (at the margin) than the 
reduction of costs infra-marginally and as long as demand is perfectly 
inelastic.
Duncan and Tisdell (1971) have shown that differences in 
the reduction of costs at the margin compared with infra-marginal 
reductions for different demand elasticities are important in assessing 
the influence of cost-reducing technical progress on an industry's profit, 
or producer's surplus. As shown in Table 2.1, the columns of their 
matrix represent the nature of the elasticity of demand and the rows 
show the differential effect of technical progress on marginal and infra­
marginal costs. The signs +, - and o denote the variation in the 
industry's surplus. In the bottom row, the question mark denotes that 
the outcome will only be clear if exact specification of the demand 
curve and the shift in costs are available.
Duncan and Tisdell present three "propositions" which corres­
pond to the columns. For simplicity, let us examine only the second 
"proposition", and go back to Griliches' under-estimate of research benefits.
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TABLE 2.1
Demand Elasticity/Reduction of Costs Matrix
Reduction of Costs 
at Margin Compared 
with Infra-Margin
Nature of Demand Curve
Perfectly
Elastic
Intermediate
Elasticity
Perfectly
Inelastic
Less + + +
Equal + + o
Greater + •? -
Source: Duncan and Tisdell (1971) Table II.
Proposition Two assumes a perfectly inelastic demand curve, in which a 
downward shift in the supply curve results in the fall of the industry's 
surplus. Of course, the result depends upon differential elements.
(i) The surplus falls if the reduction in costs at the 
margin is greater than the cost reduction for 
infra-marginal units of production.
(ii) The surplus remains unchanged if the cost reduction 
is equal for marginal and infra-marginal units
(iii) Increase in the surplus happens when the cost
reduction on the infra-marginal units is greater 
than for the marginal units.
They have illustrated these cases as reproduced in Fig. 2.5. 
In summary, Duncan and Tisdell show that "the differential effect of 
technical progress on costs as well as the elasticity of the demand 
curve are important factors in determining whether cost-reducing research 
increases an industry's surplus. Since under certain circumstances pro­
ducers can lose as a result of cost-reducing research."
15
FIGURE 2.5
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY SURPLUS WITH PERFECTLY INELASTIC DEMAND
price
output
Source: Duncan and Tisdell (1971)
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Lindner and Jarrett have depicted in Fig. 2.6 a different
case, i.e., when demand and supply are neither perfectly inelastic
nor perfectly elastic. In this Figure, is parallel to Sq , and the
vertical distance between S and S, is measured by KP,, in which Ko 1 1
should be interpreted as the proportionate reduction in costs at out­
put level only. Griliches' formula in this case is KP^Q^ (l-^Kg) 
which under-estimates the correct area A M M,A, as follows:
1. KP1Q1 (1-^ Kri) = KP1Q1 - feKTl) KP1Q1
the term KP, Q, measures P'M'M, P,1 1  1 1
2. P'M'M, P, = A M'M,A, (by the law of parallelograms)1 1  o i l
since g = the absolute value of the price-elasticity of 
demand for corn.
3. Then g AQ fi AP Qx
Qr Q0
Po“Pl
4. Substituting for g at P^, in the second term,
5.
KPpQi (^Kp) gives
KP1Q1 (^ Kg) = KP1Q1 h k
0 - 0  P yl yo # _L
P  " P -i ' Q n  O 1 1
KPiei % k
cr Qo 1
P -P o 1
%KPi [Ql-Qo]
KP.
P -P. o 1
since the area of the triangle M'MoM, = %KP, (Q ,-Q ) and,1 1 1 o
17
FIGURE 2.6
PRODUCERS' AND CONSUMERS' SURPLUS CHANGES FROM SUPPLY SHIFT
PRICE
QUANTITY
Source: R.K Lindner and F.G. Jarrett, (1976) "Measurement of the level
and distribution of research benefits’,' September, 1976.
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6. KP P'-P,1 1 
Therefore,
(P'-P ) + (P -P,) o o 1
7. KP., Q, (%KT1) = area of triangle M'M Mn1 1  o 1 1 +
P'-P
P -P_ o 1
finally, the area which is to be measured correctly
is equal to A M M. A, or o o 1 1
8 . A M M A o o 1 1 A M'M A - M'M Mn o i l  o 1
This area is greater than the one measured by KP^Q^ (l-^Kq), by
the amount area of
frH
* T) 1 TJ
0 __
__
1
M'M M P ~Pno 1 O 1
I extent the equation 8, so:
9. A M'M A - M'M M, > KP O, (1-^ KT|) o 1 1  o 1 1 1
or > KP Q - KP Q (^Kq)
or > Q [(P'-P ) + (Pq -P1)] - KP Q (^Kq)
or > Q, [(P'-P ) + (P -P-, ) ] - M'M M 1 o o 1 o 1
1 +
P'-P
P -P_ o 1
The term M'M M, will be cancelled out on both sides, thereby o 1
I can write:
P'-P
10. A M'M A > Qn [(P'-P ) + (P -P ) ] - M'M Mn [---o 1 1 1 o o l  o l P  -Pno 1
11. A M'M ,A, > OP' o 1 1  1 Q,p +1 o Qip 1 o 21P1 M'M M o 1
P'-P
or > Q, P' - Q,P, - M'M M, [--- —]V1 V1 1 o 1 P -P_o 1
since A M'M., A should be equal to Q, P'-Q.P, (to hold the inequality) o 1 1 1 1
19
and Q^P'-Q^P^ is equal to the area of rectangles 0 Q^M'P' and
0 Q^M^Pi respectively in Fig. 2.6, thereby:
A M'M A = O Q M ' P ' - O Q M P ,  = P'M'P M o i l  *1 1 1 1  1 1
P'-P
so, [the area of M'M^M^] [p-_y] is virtually the difference
o 1
between the area measured by KP, Q, (l-^ Kri) and the area A M M A .
1 1  o  o  1  1  •
From the above, Lindner and Jarrett concluded that this 
under-estimation of research benefits by the formula (when demand is 
relatively elastic) generally will be balanced by the nature of the 
formula to over-estimate benefits when reductions in cost for infra­
marginal production are less than those at the margin, "and the net 
bias introduced by using this formula is indeterminate". They developed 
an alternative general formula by which research benefits can be measured 
carefully and exactly which will be discussed later.
2.2.2 Peterson's Method
Peterson's (1967) measurement technique is based on the 
value of consumer surplus (obtained by the use of new or improved 
inputs) which is equal to the area between the old and new supply 
curves and below the demand curve. He employs K as the shift in the 
supply of Poultry Production function that would occur should the new 
inputs used by poultry farmers to get greater efficiency disappear.
His derived general formula for the measurement of annual research 
benefits, has a number of errors which have been shown by Lindner and
Jarrett (1976). Peterson's diagram is shown in Fig. 2.7.
20
FIGURE 2.7
SHIFT IN THE SUPPLY SCHEDULE RESULTING FROM THE USE OF NEW INPUTS
PRICE
QUANTITY
Source: Peterson, Willis L. (1967), "Returns to Poultry Research in the
United States,” August, 1967.
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The first error is about the area between the two supply 
curves and below the demand curve. He refers to it as consumer surplus, 
whereas it is in general the sum of producer surplus and consumer 
surplus. However, when supply is perfectly elastic, or when demand is 
perfectly inelastic AND there is a parallel shift in the supply curve, 
then increased social benefit will consist completely of consumer surplus.
The second error relates to the treatment of the variable K, 
defined as the percentage decrease in the supply function of poultry 
products that occurs if the new inputs used by poultry farmers to obtain 
higher efficiency disappear. However, in his actual treatment of K it 
is represented as the change in the equilibrium quantity of output if 
the innovation disappears; and, it is expressed as a proportion of the 
equilibrium level of output produced with the innovation, for example,
öö Q1K = — --- in Fig. 2.7. Peterson, in fact, is contradicting himself
by this definition of K which implies a horizontal, rather than a 
vertical shift of the supply curve. In addition, it understates the 
extent of the shift since it includes the effect of the equilibrating 
process which involves supply and demand together. "This approach 
makes it more difficult to interpret the effect of agricultural research 
per se on the supply function, and would require the further education 
of scientists into the mysteries of supply and demand elasticities." 
(Lindner and Jarrett, 1976).
His third error is about the claim that "area A + C  + D + E + F 
is approximately equal to area B + C + D + F". Since his supply curves 
do not intersect the vertical axis, Lindner and Jarrett find it difficult
to show why this statement is wrong (see Peterson's diagram). Therefore,
22
they present a more precise diagram (Fig. 2.6), which shows the special 
case of a parallel shift in the supply curve and a demand curve which 
is unitary and elastic. By using this figure, they show that Peterson's 
assertion about the equality of the above two areas is wrong and they 
cannot, in general, be even approximately equal.
The areas A + C + D + E + F and B + C + D + F (from
Peterson's diagram in Fig. 2.7) correspond to areas A M M,A, ando o 1 1
Q^M^M^Q^ (in Fig. 2.6) respectively. When demand is unitary they are
elastic: Q M M„ Q„ = P M M P . By the Law of Parallelograms, areao o 1 1  o o 1 .
A M'M A. = area P'M'M, P, . So area A M M a. = area P'M'M, P, - area o i l  1 1  o o l l  1 1
M M'M or A M A A > P M M , P, , by the area P'M'M P . o 1 o o l l  o o l l  o o
Greg Martin et al. (1977) believe that Peterson's formula
is backward looking - completely expost, which requires the maximum 
possible amount of information and almost impossible to apply "ex ante".
Peterson's formula for calculation of the absolute size of 
the benefits is as follows:
B K Q1P1 + h KV l  , 2- 2^ Q Kn *o
(px ) (en) (n -D  
pi  p (n+e) (n)o
where,
K is defined as the percentage shift to the left of the supply 
function, if the innovation had not been available to farmers.
£ and n are the supply and demand elasticities.
Pl^l are e(luilit,rium price and quantity of poultry
products after innovation.
PqQq are the equilibrium price and quantity of products before 
innovation.
23
Martin et al. believe that the above formula is incorrect. 
However, they present a simpler and more elegant ex ante formula:
B KP Q o o [1 +
k (i-k ) n
2en
KG ]
where K is defined (vertically) as the proportionate reduction in unit 
costs as a result of the innovation. Also K is relatively simpler to 
obtain empirically.
2.2.3 Comparison of an Alternative Formula
As was pointed out earlier, both Griliches (1958) and 
Peterson (1967) assumed that an agricultural innovation would shift 
the supply function by the same percentage amount at all levels of 
output, and went forward to measure the benefits from the innovation by 
raising the question: "What would have been the losses if this innova­
tion were to disappear?". However, (instead of this indirect approach) 
Lindner and Jarrett (1976) suggest that it will be more helpful in 
evaluating the impact of research on agricultural production if we 
take the direct approach of measuring the gains from research relative 
to the pre-innovation market equilibrium. A research manager, in 
making decisions about the amount of resources required or desired to 
be allocated to agricultural research, knows the situation of the 
current supply and has to make estimates of the impact of the research 
on future supply conditions. That is to say, he needs to estimate 
"ex ante" what the social benefits of research and their distribution
are likely to be.
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For simplicity, Lindner and Jarrett assume, as an approxi­
mation, linear supply and demand functions. Now, with reference to
Fig. 2.8, S and D denote the initial supply and demand functions o o
prior to innovation. According to them, if we postulate a proportionate 
shift in Sq , which implies that the reduction in average costs is 
greater at the margin than at infra-marginal levels of output, then 
will reflect the new, post-innovation, supply function. They suggest 
that "treating the movement of the supply function as a vertical, rather 
than a horizontal, shift emphasizes the cost-reducing nature of innova­
tions, and is the way in which research scientists can more easily 
understand the effect of their research on the supply of agricultural 
output".
In Fig. 2.8, the area A., M, M A which represents the gain in1 1 o o
consequent to the innovation, can generally be measured by the rule of
cross-multiplication. This rule is developed by J.F. Durrant and
H.R. Kingston (1946) and relies on the co-ordinates of the points A^,
M, , M , A which are expressed in an anti-clockwise direction. The l o o
co-ordinates are: 0, A, , Q, , P, , Q , P and 0, A respectively. Now1 X1 1 *o o o
the area of this rectilinear figure (A„ M, M A ) which can be separated1 1 o o
into the areas of a series of triangles may be obtained by:
[0 x Pn + P x Q, + Q x A  + 0 x A n - 0 x A  - O x P  - P, x Q 1 o *1 *o o 1 o o 1 *o
- Q1 x A 1 ] ........... (1)
which is equal to
h [P Q - P-.Q + Q A - Q A ] o 1 1 o o o 1 1 (2)
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FIGURE 2.8
PARALLEL AND NON-PARALLEL SHIFT IN SUPPLY WITH UNITARY ARC ELASTIC
DEMAND
P A
PRICE
QUANTITY
Source: R.K. Lindner and F.G. Jarrett, (1976)
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The above two expressions presented by Lindner and Jarrett 
can be derived as follows.
First, I consider the quadrilateral Z^ Z^ (Fig. 2.9)
where, by construction, we have:
BCDE as a rectangle
B Z_ G 7, A as another rectangle 3 4
Therefore,
A BZ Z = A Z GZ 3 4 3 4
Similarly,
A c z 2 z 3 - A z 3 z2h
A D Z ^  = A Z2 Z3I
A EZ_ z„ = 1 4 A ZlKZ4
Adding both sides of all equations and using Fig. 2.9 we have 
BCDE - Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4  = Z Z Z Z + IHGK
or ZZ.Z^Z.Z, = BCDE - IHGK 1 2  3 4
since area BCDE = (Y3  - Y^) (X2  - X4 )
= BE x DE
and area IHGK = (Y2 - V  (X3 - V
= IK x GK
Therefore,
2Z1Z2Z3Z4 = BCDE - IHGK
= « 3  - V<X2 - x4> - ( Y 2  - Y4) (X3 - V
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FIGURE 2.9
DIAGRAMMATICAL REPRESENTATION OF EQUATION TO MEASURE "EX ANTE" GAINS 
FROM RESEARCH WHICH WILL RESULT IN A SHIFT OF THE SUPPLY CURVE
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Y X„ + Y, X - Y X - Y X -3 2 1 4 1 2 3 4
[Y„X_ + Y . X.. - Y . X_ - Vi12 3 4 1 4 3
Y X„ + Yn X, + Y . X_ + Y_X._3 2 1 4 4 3 2 1
Y X„ Y_X_ - Y X3 4 2 3 4 1
Therefore,
Z Z Z Z *2 Y X + Y X + Y.X_ + Y„X-- 3 2  1 4  4 3  2 1
Y2X3 - Y4X1 - Y3X4 - Y1X2 (3)
In Fig. 2.8, we have the rectilinear A. M_M A , but for simplicity,1 1 o o
M = (Q , P ) o o o
1 - (V  V
let us call it Z^Z^Z^Z^,
Then,
X = 0 and -> Z = (X , Y1)
Similarly,
x2 = Bl and Y2 - Px - z2 = (X2, Y2)
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3
oPII and Y3 = Po ^ z3 (X3, V
4 = 0 and Y4 II o1* Z4 <V V
If we substitute the above in (3), we will have the same 
expression as in (2). Hence,
Z Z Z Z  = % po X Q, + A1 x 0 + A x o Q + P x 0 o 1
pi X 2o - Ao x 0 - P X o 0 - Ax x Q1
= k (P x Q + A x Q  - P x Q - A x Q ........ (2')o 1 o o 1 o 1 1
From (3) , we can write (in a vector form)
Z Z Z Z  = h [X X X X ]
Equation (4) is equal to (3).
Now, if we substitute for X^, in equation (4) we will
have
Z Z Z Z ^ [0 Qx Qo 0]
P, - A
P - A,
A - P.
A, - P
%[Si(p0 - V  + 2o <Ao - V 1 (2")
As was mentioned earlier, Griliches' measure of research 
benefit assumes a perfectly elastic supply curve. Lindner and Jarrett 
argue that in terms of Fig. 2.4, Aq in equation (2) now equals P^ and A^ = P^.
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The expression for the surplus in this special case is
%[P Q, - P-, Q + P 0, - P,Q, ] . The expression used by Griliches is o 1 1 o o 1 1 1
Loss 1 = KP^Q^ [1 - %Kp]. K is the proportionate shift in the supply
Po - P-l
function measured in a vertical direction and K = ------- in Fiq. 2.4
pi
If we evaluate the absolute value of the elasticity of demand p (at P , 
) / then:
If we substitute for K and p in the expression for Loss 1 then:
P - P P_o___ 1^_ AQ b ll_
P-L AP ' Q1
and this reduces to:
Loss 1
P - o P 0 1V1
Loss 1 k[P Q - P Q 2L oyl 1*0 + P Q - o o V i 1 (5)
From above, Lindner and Jarrett claim that equation (5) is 
the same as the result derived from the general expression in equation (2). 
Also, in the more general case when supply is less than perfectly elastic, 
the formulae in equations (2) and (3) are obviously not equal. The 
important point in equation (3) is that it measures the level of consumer 
benefits arising from adoption of the innovations, whereas, equation (2) 
measures total social producer benefit plus consumer benefit.
If we subtract equation (5) from equation (2), we will have
a measure of producer benefit.
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Therefore,
(6)
Within the assumptions made, equations (2), (5) and (6) are
Lindner and Jarrett's general results. Their applications require a
knowledge of the original equilibrium price and quantity P , Q^; the
new equilibrium price and quantity P_ , Q ; and values for A and A.,.1 1  o 1
They point out that where research results have already been incorporated
into production processes and an "ex post" measure of research benefits
is to be calculated, data on P^ and , i.e., current equilibrium price
and quantity, can be obtained. Nevertheless, the variables P , Q , Ao o o
and A^ have to be estimated indirectly. We may get extra difficulties
in applying the formulae "ex ante", as variables cannot be observed
directly. The reason is that P , Q are sensitive to other unknowno o
influences in addition to the adoption or non-adoption of the innovation.
However, given a relatively stable condition of demand and supply, we
can obtain reasonable estimates of P and Q from current levels ofo o
industry price and output. In order to estimate P^ and , the following 
formulae can be used:
(7)
(8)
In the above two formulae (adapted by Lindner and Jarrett
from those used by Pinstrup-Andersen, et al., 1976), K is the proportionate
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reduction in average costs of production, measured at , from adopting
the new technology; £ and rj are the price elasticity of supply and
demand respectively. We can make cost-reduction estimates by using
the methods pioneered by Griliches (1958) and Petersen (1967) for "ex
post" calculations, but "guess-timates" would have to be made in any
"ex ante" evaluation of research proposals. The values of and in
the nearness of P , Q and P, , Q_ can be estimated by widely-known o o 1 1
econometric techniques.
The problems associated with estimation of in the case
of "ex post" studies, or A for "ex ante" studies, are not so easy too
control. In general, Lindner and Jarrett do not believe that econo-
metrically estimated supply curves will provide reliable estimates of
An (or A ) because the available observations on P and Q used to calcu- 1 o
late supply parameters are typically far removed from the point where 
the supply curve intercepts the vertical axis. Actual estimates of 
supply curves often involve negative intercept terms. Such an abnormal 
case need not matter if the estimated supply curve is only to be used 
to project prices and/or quantities in the nearness of the original 
data set, but in their case, it is obviously illogical as it implies 
that producers are prepared to supply positive quantities at zero 
price in the long-run. Instead, they believe that A^ (or A^) can best 
be estimated by asking industry experts the following question:
Ceteris Paribus, to what level would prices have to fall for industry 
output to fall to zero in the long run?". A subjective procedure of 
this type is obviously expected to make ready widely differing estimates 
depending upon the particular experts consulted. Lindner and Jarrett 
cannot help avoiding this problem but it is made less severe by the
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f a c t  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  l e v e l  o f  r e s e a r c h  b e n e f i t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y
i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  v a l u e  o f  A, ( o r  A ) u s e d  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a .1 o
E s t i m a t e d  b e n e f i t s  o f  r e s e a r c h  a r e ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  much
m ore s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s h i f t  i n  t h e  s u p p l y  c u r v e  i n d u c e d
by a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  i n n o v a t i o n  w h ic h ,  g i v e n  A . , d e t e r m i n e s  A , o r  t h e
1 o
o t h e r  way r o u n d .  G r i l i c h e s '  a r g u m e n t s  (1958) f o r  a  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  
s h i f t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  h y b r i d  c o r n ,  seem c o n v i n c i n g ,  b u t  t h e y  a r e  o n l y  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  l o w - c o s t  i n n o v a t i o n s  w h ic h  i n c r e a s e  y i e l d s  by  a n  e q u a l  
p r o p o r t i o n a t e  am o u n t f o r  a l l  p r o d u c e r s .
The ab o v e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  l e v e l  o f  
a n n u a l  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  f rom  a d o p t i o n  o f  a n  i n n o v a t i o n  i s  a f f e c t e d  by  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s h i f t  o f  t h e  s u p p l y  c u r v e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t o  e s t i m a t e  
a g g r e g a t e  b e n e f i t s  f ro m  r e s e a r c h ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  i n n o v a t i o n  o n  t h e  a v e r a g e  c o s t  o f  i n f r a - m a r g i n a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  i t s  e f f e c t  o n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  an d  q u a n t i t y  
o f  i n d u s t r y  o u t p u t .  The m o s t  c o n s p i c u o u s  p a r t  o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  
t h e  n ee d  t o  g i v e  e x p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  A
o
and  A ^, t h a t  i s ,  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s h i f t  i n  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n .  I f
we c o n t r a s t  L i n d n e r  and  J a r r e t t ' s  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  a t t e m p t s  o f  G r i l i c h e s
(1 9 5 8 ) ,  P e t e r s o n  (1967) a n d  A k ino  an d  Hayami (1975) i n  t h e i r  s t u d i e s
a t  m e a s u r in g  r e s e a r c h  b e n e f i t s ,  we w i l l  n o t i c e  t h a t  e a c h  o f  t h e s e
s t u d i e s  h a s  v i r t u a l l y  made i m p l i c i t  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  A^ an d  A ^ . F o r
e x a m p le ,  G r i l i c h e s ,  by a s s u m in g  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  s u p p l y  c u r v e ,  u s e s
P a n d  Pn a s  t h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  A an d  A, r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  w h e r e a s  A k ino  o 1 o 1
and  Hayami assu m e  t h a t  A^ an d  A^ a r e  b o t h  c o i n c i d e n t  w i t h  t h e  o r i g i n .  
Such a s s u m p t i o n s  do n o t  seem  v e r y  p l a u s i b l e .  M o re o v e r ,  L i n d n e r  an d  
J a r r e t t  c o n s i d e r  P e t e r s o n ' s  a p p r o a c h ,  w h e re  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  A^
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are subsumed in the estimating procedures used to calculate the supply 
elasticity, and where A^ is pre-calculated by Aq and the assumption of 
a proportional shift in the supply function, as equally "unsatisfactory". 
Particularly, when we do not see any good reason (in general) why the 
shift in the supply curve should be proportional rather than parallel, 
pivotal about A^, or convergent.
In conclusion, as it seems unreasonable from empirical 
evidence to support Griliches1 assumption of a perfectly elastic supply 
curve, then it follows that his formula will over-estimate the measure 
of research benefits. Similarly, even though Peterson's formula takes 
into account the effects of supply and demand elasticities, over­
estimation of benefits will still result.
The usefulness of the methods to the problem of allocation 
of resources in research is important. Both Griliches and Peterson's 
approaches are restricted to evaluation of research results after the 
research has been done and made available to producers. However, 
equation (2) from Lindner and Jarrett allows prediction of benefits 
prior to undertaking the research and thus decisions can be made on 
whether or not to undertake the research.
Certainly the proposed alternative of estimating Aq and A^ 
directly is not a simple task, and involves simplifying assumptions.
By doing a simple sensitivity analysis the above procedure suggested
by Lindner and Jarrett seems fairly rigorous.
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2.3 Input-Demand Method
R.C. Duncan (1972) attempted to identify pasture research 
findings which have been important for the development of improved 
pastures in some agricultural regions in Australia and to estimate the 
IRR on the investment in pasture research in those regions. His tech­
nique is based on the estimation of input-demand functions for the 
stock of improved pastures.
He estimated the contribution made by individual research 
findings rather than estimating the benefits flowing from research by 
the output supply-shift used by Griliches since this method would not 
have been suitable in those circumstances. This is so because the 
adoption of new pasture technology by farmers is not directly observ­
able in yield responses such as an increase in wool or beef. The 
input-demand method becomes a means of estimating the benefits generated 
by an increase in the productivity of an input, which in this case has 
been improved pastures.
To illustrate, take Fig. 2.10 in which the input-demand 
curve is assumed to have a negative slope; ID^ and ID^ are input-demand 
curves prior to an increase in productivity and after an increase in 
productivity, respectively. The hatched area (given certain assumptions) 
represents the gross welfare gains from the increase in productivity.
It is the value of this area which he estimates.
Duncan specifies and estimates the input-demand functions 
in double-log form. He also assumes a parallel shift (of the logarithmic 
function, i.e. constant elasticity) in the input-demand curve from ID^
FIGURE 2.10
THE GAINS FROM AN INCREASE IN THE PRODUCTIVITY OF AN INPUT
A
input
price
A
j
0
input quantity
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to ID^/ which implies a non-parallel shift of the curve in its non­
linear form.
The movement from Q to usually involves a number of 
years taking account of the lagged adoption of the new technology.
In this time the price of product and the price of input could have 
been changed. For calculating purposes he strongly assumes that 
the shift from ID^ to ID^ relates to some ID curve based on an 
average product price for the period of the shift from to Q .
Also, it has to be assumed that the input price is some average of 
the cost of improving pastures during the period.
A single-equation regression model is formulated which is 
used to estimate (i) input own-price elasticity of demand, and identi­
fies (ii) important research findings. From (ii) Duncan estimates
the shift from Q, to . From (ii) and (i), he derives (by integration) 1 2
a formula which gives an estimate of the gross value of the hatched 
area (see Fig. 2.10). In the model,
(a) the area of improved pastures on farms in 
selected areas is treated as a durable input, and
(b) the demand for the stock of improved pasture is 
a function of its real price and the state of 
pasture technology,
(c) polynomial distributed lags are fitted which helps 
to overcome multicollinearity and simplifies the 
regression to each of these independent variables 
in order to estimate the lags in adjustment of 
the stock which is associated with changes in 
input and product prices and the state of pasture 
technology.
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Three dynamic aspects of the shift from ID^ to ID^ should 
be cited: firstly, the shift from to does not occur instantan­
eously. It appears, for that reason, that the long-run elasticity of 
input demand is the relevant one. Secondly, the improvement in 
technology may be lost over time due, for example, to pests, insects 
and diseases. Thirdly, the input demand curve can also shift with 
changes in product prices, and this will change the size of the hatched 
area for a given improvement in technology. Therefore, estimation of 
the discounted value of future benefits involves predictions about the 
price of products.
Duncan's model is a dynamic interpretation of the neo­
classical theory of the demand for an input. According to the static 
theory of the competitive firm, every decision maker wishes to maximize 
his profits within a framework of input-output relationships and price 
ratios, instant adjustment and unlimited capital. Also, the individual's 
decisions for production under perfect competition have no effect on 
prices. Stigler (1952) points out that within such a static framework 
changes in demand for an input will depend on:
(i) changes in the product price;
(ii) changes in the input cost and in other 
inputs cost, and
(iii) changes in the productivity of the input.
Duncan assumes that there is no "money illusion" and hence the input 
demand function is homogeneous of degree zero. Thereby, the demand
for an input is a function of real or relative prices.
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Jorgenson (1963) shows that under certain assumptions 
the demand for the services of a durable input (such as improved 
pastures in this study) depends on its real price and relative price.
We cannot usually measure the services of durable inputs, but, if we 
assume that the flow of services is a constant proportion of the 
stock, then we can hypothesize that the demand for the stock of a 
durable input is also a function of its real prices and relative prices.
Therefore, we have:
K = f (P /P 'PTy PT,'R.'UJ  t It Pt It Jt t t
where implies the level of improved pastures at time t
P^/P is the input's real price at time t
P /P is the relative price of the input It U t
is a shift variable which denotes imporvements in 
the state of pasture technology
U represents an error term which is assumed to be random
and uncorrelated with the independent variables.
Duncan drops the relative price variable from the equation due to the 
problem of the high level of collinearity with the variable of real price.
Prices, particularly product prices, are not certain in 
the planning period; so it is assumed that producers expect the 
immediate past prices to hold in the future.
In order to make the model dynamic, the assumption of 
instant adjustment in the stock of improved pastures is relaxed. As
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the results of research take time to become widely-spread, a lag in 
adoption due to uncertainty is expected which decreases with the 
increase in percentage of producers adopting the new farming practice. 
Research results are included (as separate dummy variables) in the 
input-demand equations. A value of 1 is assigned to all years 
following the year in which publication of the research result is 
fulfilled, and a value of 0 for years before publication of research. 
Polynomial lags are generated on each of these variables to estimate 
the adoption rate.
Duncan also fits a polynomial lag structure to the real 
price variable. So, the equation to be estimated is equation (2) in 
which W(i) is considered as lag weights:
n-1 n-1
(2) In Kt = bo + E wx (i)ln(P /P ) + E w2(i)Rt +Ut
i=o i=o
The input-demand function is estimated with the variables 
expressed as logarithms. Therefore, the coefficients estimated on 
the price variables can be accounted as "geometric" average elastici­
ties of demand.
As is illustrated in Fig. 2.10, the net gain to society 
from an increase in the productivity of improved pastures is equal to 
the value of the hatched area (ABCD) representing the gross welfare 
gains, minus research costs, and also minus any losses which arise 
from market distortions due to subsidies, etc. Duncan ignores the 
latter costs, since they are small for the wool industry. The value 
of the area ABCD can be estimated by the following formula which is 
derived by integration:
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"Q,/b -Qo/h
(3) b(Pe - Pe Z/°) - P(Q2~Q )
where,
b is the long-run price elasticity of demand
P is the average cost of improving pastures during the time
taken to move from Q, to 0*1 2
Duncan assumes that the shift from ID^ to ID^ is related to some input-
demand curve based on an average price of product for the period which
involves the movement from Q, to f) .1 2
The major results from application of the input-demand model 
to three regions (Northern Tablelands, N.S.W. and Southern Tablelands, 
N.S.W. - both wool growing areas; and the wheat/sheep zone in Western 
Australia) are:
(1) Internal rates of return have been estimated 
(on important research findings) to have been 
very high.
(2) The adoption lags, in this study, are very short.
Duncan believes that the image of the farmer as 
an unresponsive producer to technological change 
does need to be questioned.
(3) Lags in adjustment of imporved pastures to price 
change are very short too.
As there exists a high degree of collinearity between the 
own and cross price variables, it is not possible in general to separate 
the effects of the two. Thus, we cannot draw any steady conclusions 
concerning the role which factor substitution between land and improved
pastures has played in the demand for improved pastures.
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There can be two approaches to measuring adoption and 
adoption lags of new and improved inputs. The usual practice socio­
logically is the measurement of numbers of farmers adopting overtime. 
This study measures the adoption of a new practice by a shift in the 
demand curve for the input, i.e. improved pastures. Thus it is 
necessary to distinguish changes along the demand curve due to price 
changes from changes in demand which are due to a shift in demand 
curve resulting from research which has increased the marginal pro­
ductivity of the input.
Duncan's results on adoption lags can be compared with 
those obtained by Evenson (1967). Evenson estimated the aggregate 
research lag for U.S. agriculture, which he defined as the lag between 
the expenditure on research and the impact on production. This is a 
different formulation of the lag than that used by Duncan which was 
essentially the lag from publication of the results to adoption by 
farmers. Evenson's estimate of the average research lag for U.S. 
agriculture was 6 to years. For individual research findings 
Duncan found widely differing lags - from as short as 2 years up to 
9 years.
Duncan’s input-demand approach to the measurement of 
research benefits was novel in two important respects. First, it 
attempted to measure the benefits from individual projects - rather 
than measuring aggregate gains. Second, it measured the benefits in 
terms of the effect on the marginal productivity of the input con­
cerned, rather than the change in output generated. The question 
which should have been raised is whether these two approaches are
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c o m p a t i b l e .  The q u e s t i o n  was u l t i m a t e l y  r a i s e d ,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e  i n  
t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  t h o u g h  n o t  d i r e c t l y  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  m e a s u r in g  t h e  
g a i n s  from  r e s e a r c h .
2 .4  The A p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  U s in g  S u p p ly  A n a l y s i s  V e r s u s  In p u t-D e m a n d  
A n a l y s i s
The u s e  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t  s u p p l y  c u r v e  v e r s u s  t h e  i n p u t -  
demand c u r v e  t o  m e a s u r e  w e l f a r e  g a i n s  f ro m  r e s e a r c h  c a n  be  c l a r i f i e d  
by r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  d e b a t e  b e tw e e n  S c h m a le n s e e  (1971) an d  W i s e c a r v e r  
(1974) on  t h e  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  w e l f a r e  g a i n s .
One o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  r e s u l t i n g  fro m  a  s h i f t  i n  t h e  s u p p l y  
c u r v e  i s  t h e  s c a l e  e f f e c t  i n  w h ic h ,  due  t o  a n  i n p u t  p r i c e  c h a n g e ,  
t h e r e  i s  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  c h a n g e  i n  o u t p u t  p r i c e ,  p r o d u c i n g  a  s h i f t  
i n  co n su m er  c h o i c e  an d  c h a n g in g  co n su m e r  s u r p l u s .
The o t h e r  c h a n g e  t h a t  w i l l  o c c u r  when i n p u t  p r i c e  i s  
a l t e r e d  i s  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  i n p u t  c o m b i n a t i o n s  u s e d  i n  p r o d u c t i o n .
A p r i c e  ch a n g e  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n p u t  s u b s t i t u t i o n .  I t  w i l l  
be shown t h a t  t h i s  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  i s  o n l y  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  i n  t h e  
m e a su rem en t  o f  w e l f a r e  g a i n s  u s i n g  t h e  i n p u t - d e m a n d  c u r v e .
S c h m a le n s e e  c o n t e n d s  t h a t  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  i s  n o t  
a com ponen t  o f  w e l f a r e  g a i n  ( l o s s )  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  a d v o c a t e s  m e a s u re m e n t  
o f  w e l f a r e  u s i n g  t h e  s h i f t  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t  s u p p l y  c u r v e .  However t h e  
W i s e c a r v e r  p a p e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  e r r o r s  h a v e  a r i s e n  i n  m e a s u r in g  w e l f a r e  
c o s t s  ( g a i n s ) . The two e r r o r s  d e s c r i b e d  a r e  (1) d o u b le  c o u n t i n g  o f
w e l f a r e  c o s t s ,  an d  (2) t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  i s  n o t
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a true social cost. These errors are avoided by the measurement of 
welfare costs (gains) in the input market only. Wisecarver's analysis 
shows that all components of social cost (benefit) will be contained 
in such a measurement.
(1) Source of the Double-Counting Error
There are two approaches to measuring social costs. First, 
the two sector (production and consumption) approach uses a shift 
(distortion) in the transformation function causing a movement to a 
lower social indifference curve and hence a loss of welfare. It 
clearly shows losses are due to inefficiency in production plus dis­
tortion of consumer choice. Inefficiency in production results from 
increased cost of a given output when one of the inputs increases in 
price, due to a substitution away from that input to a non-optimal 
combination. Distortion in consumer choice reflects loss of utility 
as the price of the product increases.
Second, the economic surplus method looks at welfare costs 
(gains) in terms of changes in areas corresponding to producers' and 
consumers' surplus; in this case in the input market where the price 
change (distortion) has occurred.
The error is to claim that the surplus measure in the 
input market contains only the inefficiency in production effect and 
that it is necessary to add the effects on consumers' and producers' 
surplus from the output market to obtain the total change in welfare.
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This is clearly shown to be wrong by an analysis of the 
component areas of welfare loss (gain) between the supply and derived 
demand curves in the input market.
To illustrate the case simply, we assume the case of fixed
proportions of inputs capital (K) and labour (L) to produce a unit of
output (X). Thus, S is the sum of S and S , i.e. X = min (L,K).X L K
The other relationship between the input and output market
is that D is a derived demand from D ; that is, D = D - S .L X L X K
Hence, in Fig. 2.11 we have initially the curves D , S ,X X
D , S and S with equilibrium at E and E" for the output and input L L K
markets respectively.
The tax on labour, t = F'H’ moves production to the point 
where amounts of labour L ’ and capital K' are used to produce X' of 
output.
The loss of welfare is shown by EFH and E'F'H' in the out­
put and input markets respectively. In this case of fixed proportions 
these areas are equal. Let P, W and R be the prices of X, L and K 
respectively.
d d d s sNow = W + Rg = W1 + T + T1
and P1 = W1 + R1
, d sso that = T
and EFH = E'F'H'
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FIGURE 2.11
EFFECTS OF A TAX DISTORTION IN INPUT AND OUTPUT MARKETS
_ \  F
~ x ~
Quantities
Source: Daniel Wisecarver (1974).
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To analyse the components we alter the assumptions on the
shape of D and S and then build up the components by changing them X L
back to their original position.
Let D move to D  ^and hence D becomes D Let S moveX X *  L L* L
to S so that S becomes S Now loss of welfare is DGM orL** X X**
E'G'M' which both equal E"JM" or loss of rent on capital, the untaxed
factor. There is no loss of consumer surplus or loss of rent to
labour. Relaxing the perfectly elastic labour supply, S moves toL* *
S and therefore S ^  to S . The increase in welfare cost E ’M'H' or L X** X
EMH is a welfare cost to labour, i.e. loss of rent on labour.
Also, as Wisecarver depicts:
then,
EGH = E’G’H' 
and therefore:
E 'M 'H * = EMH
Now we allow to return to and therefore to D^.
Now there is a loss of consumer surplus of EFG. But as EFH = E'F’H ’ 
and EGH = E’G'H’, then EFG = E'F'G’. That is, the input market has 
captured the loss of consumer surplus due to the derived nature of 
the demand curve.
The demand for an input occurs only because it provides
finished (consumer) products which have utility. Hence, the utility
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or area under an input's derived demand curve is a "reflected" utility 
resulting from the service (product) the input finally provides. Thus 
changes in the "surplus" area under a derived input-demand curve 
includes the consumer or scale effect. Hence, double counting will 
result if the changes in product market "surplus area" are added to 
those in the input market.
(2) The Substitution Effect, Social Loss and the Advantages of the 
Input Market Approach
The graphical analysis above has shown that the input 
market and output market measures are identical where output is pro­
duced from fixed proportions of inputs, i.e. the price change has not 
had a substitution effect. In the variable proportions case (inputs 
are able to substitute for each other along an isoquant) the two 
markets, input and product, give different results.
Wisecarver assumes a production function homogeneous of 
degree one to derive an expression for the elasticity of demand for 
labour in terms of the elasticity of demand for the output and the 
elasticity of substitution (labour with capital).
Substituting this expression into the formula for the area 
of the welfare cost triangle resulting from the tax on labour, he 
obtains the result for welfare cost being the sum of the scale effect 
(loss of "reflected" utility due to product price distortion) plus 
the substitution effect (reduced output due to non-optimal input com­
bination) . Wisecarver compares this with a similar derivation for 
the welfare cost of the tax due to a shift in the product supply curve
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(i.e. in the product market) and finds that here welfare cost equals 
only the scale effect.
The output market does not measure the substitution effect. 
This leads to the question: Is the substitution effect a true
welfare cost? Wisecarver establishes that it is a true welfare cost 
in three ways:
(1) from the two-sector approach to welfare loss we 
have a part of welfare loss due to inefficiency 
in production. This is the substitution effect.
(2) from an isoquant diagram we derive the increased 
costs of producing the same output (i.e. the 
social costs) which when expanded by the Taylor 
Series gives us an expression that is equal to 
the substitution effect.
(3) by comparing tax revenue (to Government) from
(a) tax, t%, on labour, and (b) a tax t %, onXL
the product X where t is defined as theXL
indirect tax on X because of the tax t on labour.
The tax (b) is greater than (a) by an amount equal to the 
substitution effect. That is, the output market reduces the estimation 
of welfare loss by over-estimating the tax revenue.
Wisecarver notes that in theory we might derive the sub­
stitution loss in the output market from this tax effect but that in 
practice it is likely to be impossible.
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Discussion
In the case of fixed input proportions, the output supply 
function and input demand analysis will give identical welfare gain 
(loss) measures. The input demand analysis does include the loss of 
consumer welfare due to the derived nature of the input-demand curve.
In the case of variable input proportions, output supply 
analysis omits the loss (gain) in welfare due to substitution of 
inputs in production. The substitution effect, corresponding to the 
inefficiency in production effect from the two-sector approach, is 
clearly a welfare cost.
Thus, input-demand analysis of welfare gains or losses 
must be regarded as being the only effective approach when dealing 
with a change in the price (including distortions of factor markets) 
of an input, except where fixed proportions can be appropriately 
assumed.
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CHAPTER 3
DISTRIBUTION OF RELATIVE GAINS (LOSSES) FROM 
RESEARCH AMONG PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS
3.1 Introduction
Following on the earlier pioneering work by Griliches and 
those who used and developed his method of estimating the absolute 
social gains from agricultural research, attention was turned to the 
distribution of these benefits between producers and consumers in 
aggregate. The technique used was simply the extension of the Supply- 
Shift method to recognise changes in producers' and consumers’ surplus.
In Section 3.2 Akino and Hayami (1975) estimate the dis­
tribution of returns among producers and consumers resulting from 
public investment in rice breeding research in Japan. They obtain 
results for both the self-sufficiency (no imports) case and the open- 
economy case. Akino and Hayami employ the special case of a supply 
curve which passes through the origin, and the restraints which this 
assumption places on the subsequent analysis and results are noted.
The study of the economic impact of investment in cotton 
seed research and development in Sao Paulo, Brazil, by Ayer and Schuh 
(1972) is reviewed in Section 3.3. As well as using the assumption 
that the supply curve passes through the origin, Ayer and Schuh impose 
a dynamic structure on quantity response to prices - in effect they
assume a Cobweb response.
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In Section 3.4 the work of the Industries Assistance 
Commission in estimating the distribution of research gains among 
producers and consumers for the most important of Australia's agri­
cultural products is reviewed.
Section 3.5 compares the different assumptions made in 
these studies and the results obtained.
3.2 Akino and Hayami1s Method
Akino and Hayami (1975) employ the approach developed by 
Griliches (1958), Peterson (1967), Schmitz and Seckler (1970) and 
Ayer and Schuh (1972) to estimate the social rate of returns to public 
investment in rice breeding research and the distribution of the 
returns between producers and consumers, both in the case of autarky 
(self-sufficiency) and in the case of an open economy where rice 
imports are allowed. Their model of estimating social returns takes, 
firstly, the assumption of market equilibrium in a closed economy.
Later, they attempt to incorporate into their model the implications 
of rice imports and government policy.
They use the Marshallian concepts of social welfare and 
cost for the measurement of social returns to rice breeding research - 
in terms of changes in consumers' and producers' surpluses resulting 
from the shift in the supply curve of rice which corresponds to a 
shift in the rice production function. The above relation is depicted 
in Fig. 3.1. In this static model the demand curve, dd, and the 
supply curve represent the actual market demand and supply functions 
respectively, while "represents the supply curve that would have
FIGURE 3.1
MODEL OF ESTIMATING SOCIAL RETURNS TO RICE BREEDING RESEARCH
rice
Qo rice quantity
Source: Akino and Hayami (1975)
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existed if the improved rice varieties were not developed". is
the price of rice that the government determines to maintain and 
is the price of rice if the improved rice varieties were not developed.
By assuming an equilibrium in the market and no rice
import, the shift in the supply curve from to Sq increases the
consumers' surplus by area ABD + area BP P C, and the producers'n o
surplus by area ACO - area BP P C. Finally, the increase in socialn o
benefit is shown by area ABC + area ACO.
Japan, however, remained a net importer of rice during
the period of analysis (1904-1950). The government regulated the rice
import by tariffs and quotas to maintain basically a stable price
level for rice so as to stop the urban workers' costs of living rising.
If the domestic supply schedule did not shift from S to S , the govern-n o
ment would have manipulated policy instruments to increase rice imports
by the distance Q^Q . The producers' surplus would have been reduced
(due to this policy) by area BP P C without being compensated by arean o
ACO.
Akino and Hayami argue that in the absence of any breeding 
program (which otherwise shifted domestic supply from to Sq), pro­
ducers' surplus would have been smaller by area ACO. They define this 
area as the producers' gain in economic welfare from the rice breeding 
research on the assumption of a price stabilization policy by means of 
rice imports. Under this assumption, consumers' surplus remains un­
changed, so the producers' gain would be equivalent to the total social
benefit produced from the rice breeding programs.
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Akino and Hayami's model for quantitative estimation 
assumes, firstly, a constant elasticity demand function as in (1).
(1) q = HP 11
where q and P are the quantity and the price of rice respectively, 
and q is the price elasticity of demand. The second assumption takes 
a constant elasticity supply function as in (2).
(2) q = GP^
where y is the price elasticity of supply for rice.
Akino and Hayami assume a hypothetical supply curve that 
would have existed if no improved varieties had been used as in (3):
(3) q = (l-h)GPY
where h represents the shift rate in the supply function because of 
varietal improvement.
They argue that in competitive equilibrium the supply 
function is equivalent to the marginal cost function derived from the 
production function. Also, as the relation between the shift rate in 
the marginal cost function (h) and the shift rate in the production 
function (k) can be approximated by (4),
(4) h % (1 + y)k
then in equilibrium the following approximation formulae will hold:
area ABC o o
[k (1 + Y)]2
Y + n
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area AOC a, kP q o o
P q k(l + Y)
area BP P C ^ -----------  x [1n o  Y + n
^k(l + Y)n 
Y + n - ^k(l + Y)]
and area ACQ'Q % (1 + Y)kP q n o  o o
Akino and Hayami's analysis provides an interesting contrast
as they assume a particular mathematical form for the supply function
which passes through the origin. The actual supply function which
they assume is a constant elasticity function of the form presented
in equation (2). A horizontal shift in the supply function is achieved
by changing the value of G. As both supply curves S and S (withoutn o
and with the innovation) pass through the origin, Akino and Hayami 
implicitly assume without any supporting empirical evidence that the 
costs reduction at the margin is greater than (the reduction of costs) 
infra-marginally. Consequently, they almost without doubt reduce 
their estimate of returns to research, and incidentally, influence 
the nature of their conclusions about the effects of the distribution 
of the benefits of rice breeding research in Japanese agriculture as 
well. Recall that Duncan and Tisdell (1971) have shown how the dis­
tribution of research benefits between producers and consumers depends 
upon the nature of the shift in the supply curve, and on the elas­
ticity of demand for the product. If research reduces the cost of 
marginal production more than for infra-marginal production, and if 
demand is inelastic, returns from research to producers may be negative. 
Akino and Hayami's empirical work in their Table 3.1 supports the theo­
retical analysis illustrated by Duncan and Tisdell.
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In the autarky case, the elasticity of demand is assumed 
as 0.2 and consumers are the sole beneficiaries of the research. On 
the other hand, producers are always made worse-off and disadvantaged 
(producer surplus falls) although the increase in consumer surplus 
offsets this fall. Lindner and Jarrett (1976) argue that it is only 
in the open economy case with infinitely elastic demand that producer 
surplus increases, that is, the social gain from the shift in supply 
would be totally captured by the producers. In this case, the increase 
in producer surplus is coincident with increase in total social benefit. 
For this reason, Lindner and Jarrett (1976) point out that the con­
clusions drawn by Akino and Hayami regarding the distributive effects 
of research, given the nature of their postulated shift in the supply 
function, are responsive to their demand elasticity estimates only.
In conclusion, the Akino-Hayami method is too simple and 
yields results which are quite unreasonable. In Table 3.1, the 
cumulated losses to producers in column (1) are impossible to believe. 
Indeed if producers were experiencing losses of this order of mangi- 
tude they would have negative incomes before the end of the period.
The elasticities utilized in this analysis are not really long-run 
elasticities. Further, the method does not fully take into account 
the growing market or the possibility that supply functions themselves 
respond to productivity change.
3.3 Ayer and Schuh's Method
Harry W. Ayer and G. Edward Schuh (1972) used the same basic 
framework as used by Griliches and Peterson for the analysis of the
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social rates of return on investments in cotton-research in Brazil.
They assumed a positively-sloped supply function for the main analysis. 
Their approach is based on the concepts of consumer and producer surplus. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates social returns due to a supply shift as the 
difference between the total benefits to society (with the improved 
seed varieties which is the area OABC), less the production cost OAD, 
and the total benefits to society (with unimproved varieties which is 
the area OEFC), less the production cost OEG. So,
Social returns = (OABC - OAD) - (OEFC - OEG)
The analysis incorporated the following assumptions. The 
demand curve is dependent on current year prices. S is the supply 
curve with improved varieties of cotton, and S' is the supply of cotton 
when unimproved cotton varieties are used. Both supply curves pass 
through the origin and the case of greater reduction of costs at the 
margin compared with infra-marginal cost reductions holds. They postu­
lated that the supply of cotton depends on the previous year's price. 
Hence, in Figure 2.3 the previous year's price (P^ ) yields supply A 
which sells at price • K is the percentage shift of S' to the left 
of S, and this shift is determined by the difference in yield between 
the unimproved and improved varieties and the proportion of each new 
variety planted.
In order to give the demand equation an annual basis they 
have "collapsed" the estimated demand equation into two dimensions 
defined by the price and quantity of Southern Brazil cotton fibre. So,
(1) DCFS : PCFS n QCFS -.188
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FIGURE 3.2
SOCIAL RETURNS DUE TO SUPPLY SHIFT
k
S'CFS
SCFS
DCFS
Source: Ayer and Schuh (1972)
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where, n includes all parameters and variables influencing demand but 
excluded from the above (1), by substituting the annual quantity 
(observed) which is OA from Fig. 3.2, and price (P^ ) into equation (1). 
The estimation of n can be done directly and equation (1) is defined 
annually as n varies from year to year. They have employed the same 
procedure to calculate a two-dimensional supply equation on an annual 
basis. So,
---- .944(2) SCFS : QCFS = m (PCFS ) 
where,
QCFS is the quantity of cotton fibre from southern Brazil
PCFS , is the price of cotton fibre from the south of Brazil t-1 in the previous time period
m represents the remaining parameters and their corres­
ponding variables influencing supply.
The parameter m (and hence the supply equation) is calculated annually 
by substituting the observed quantity (A) and previous years price (P^ ) 
into equation (2) for each year and solving for m.
K depends on two things: (1) changes in yield and fibre
per cent; and (2) distribution of varieties. K is equal to,
x Y F
Z [(1 - — — ) . P ] . 100 for any particular year, Y F aa=l a a
where,
Y^ = yield of the new variety 'a'
Y^ = average yield of the unimproved varieties
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F = fibre % of the new variety 'a' a
= average fibre % of the unimproved varieties 
= the % of variety 'a' distributed 
x = the number of varieties distributed in any particular year
Since S'CFS = (1-K).SCFS
Therefore,
----  .944(3) S'CFS : QCFS = (l-K)m (PCFS^ .)t-1
where K, m, and PCFS^ show variation from year to year. Ayer and 
Schuh have shown that once equations (1), (2), and (3) are estimated
for each of the years of a given time period, i.e., 1931 to 1967 in 
their research, the annual social returns may be determined by solving 
the fourth equation as follows:
Social returns = JA (DCFS) d (QCFS)o
(4)
- JA (SCFS) d (QCFS)o
- JE (DCFS) d (QCFS)o
+ JE (S'CFS) d (QCFS) o
Ayer and Schuh have compared the social returns with the 
costs of the breeding program by calculating the internal rate of 
return. According to them, the internal rate of return is the rate (r)
which results in the following equality:
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~ t ~ t(5) Z R (1+r) = Z C (1+r) or discounted returns is
t=l t=l
equal to discounted costs.
Where,
t = year (year 1924 is assumed to be 1)
f = the year costs and returns end, in this study is assumed
to be year 1985 (62 years after the breeding program began)
R = the estimated social returns in year t
C = the estimated costs of research and development in year t 
r = the internal rate of return
Based on the above assumptions, the internal rate of return 
is calculated to be 89 per cent. Although they bias upward the esti­
mates of costs and bias downward the estimates of returns, the return 
on investment is still very high.
Sensitivity Analysis
Ayer and Schuh mention that different assumptions about the 
supply and demand elasticities and the shift factor K will result in 
different estimates of the internal rate of return. In this study, 
the 89 per cent IRR is based on three basic parameters, i.e., elasticity 
of demand (-5.3), elasticity of supply (.944), and estimates of K. As 
Brazil can always sell on the export market (where it is relatively 
unimportant), it seems reasonable to question why the estimated price 
elasticity of demand for cotton fibre is -5.3, when it should have 
been near to infinity. Ayer and Schuh claim that the reason they have
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used the estimate of -5.3 is that it has been based on empirical 
evidence. Also, they claim that the probable effect of limitations 
by the Brazilian government on cotton exports was to make the demand 
elasticity less than infinite. This is, in effect, a contradiction 
of the statement that Brazil's production is unimportant in world 
trade. It is likely that the econometric results are spurious.
In a similar fashion, an alternative estimate of the supply 
elasticity for cotton fibre, based on a longer series of data, was 
only about half that used in the above calculations (.449 compared 
with .944). Ayer and Schuh mention that it might be argued that the 
lower supply elasticity is more appropriate to calculate the social 
rate of return because the returns are generated over a long time 
period. Therefore, in order to test the sensitivity of the results 
to this elasticity, they set the supply estimates equal to both zero 
and 1.5. The results show that the internal rate of return is not 
sensitive to different price elasticities. If the supply elasticity 
is held unchanged and a perfectly elastic demand curve be assumed, 
the rate of return reduces by only two percentage points (from 89 per 
cent to 87 per cent). The results are shown in Table 3.2.
The internal rates of return are 89 and 80 per cent 
respectively, indicating a high rate of return by any standard.
Lastly, they argue that estimates of K, the supply shifter, 
could be subject to error. So, they recompute the internal rate of 
return with K assumed to be 10 per cent less and 10 per cent more than 
the original estimates. As it is presented in Table 3.2, again the
internal rate of return is almost insensitive.
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TABLE 3.2
Estimated Internal Rates of Return (Per Cent) Under Various 
Assumptions Concerning Elasticity of Supply and Demand and
the Shift Factor K
K
Elasticities
K nominal K nominal -10%
K nominal 
+10%
Ks = .944 89% 86% 92%
Ed = -5.3
Es = .944 87% 84% 90%
E a
= OO
Es = 0 107% 104% 110%
Ed = OO
Es = 1.5 80% 77% 82%
Ed = OO
Source: Ayer and Schuh (1972).
The above assumptions indicate that the internal rate
return to investments in cotton seed research and development has
very important (about 90 per cent). Particularly if we compare these 
estimates with those obtained by Griliches (35 to 40 per cent for the 
hybrid seed corn research), Peterson (20 to 30 per cent for poultry
research), and Akino and Hayami (under the assigned experiment system,
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about 74 per cent for rice breeding research), we should accept 
Sao Paulo's cotton seed research and development program has paid 
off impressively. Further aspects of this study will be discussed in 
Section 3.5.
3.4 Studies by the Industries Assistance Commission
In Australia the Industries Assistance Commission (I.A.C.) 
(1976) elaborates on the distribution of the benefits (resulting from 
a downward shift in the supply curve) between producers, domestic con­
sumers and overseas consumers. The distribution of the benefits of 
research between the above groups depends upon how much of the fall in 
unit costs is in fact transmitted through to the final price of the 
product. This transmission is influenced by both the elasticity of 
supply of producers and the elasticity of demand of consumers, and by 
the type of shift in the supply curve. In order to estimate the dis­
tribution of benefits, the I.A.C. adopts the simplest theoretical case, 
namely, a parallel shift of a linear supply curve. That is, unit 
costs of production are reduced equally for both infra-marginal and 
marginal units of output. In Fig. 3.3 demand is perfectly elastic, 
i.e. the case where Australian production sold internationally has no 
effect on price OP. An increase in productivity will reduce costs of 
production and shift the supply curve S to , The gain accruing to 
producers is equivalent to the sahded area. In this case no benefits 
accrue to consumers. A movement leftwards of the supply curve from 
to S illustrates the effect of a research levy on producers, in which
case the producers bear the full impact of the levy. Alternatively,
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FIGURE 3.3
RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF THE SUPPLY CURVE DUE TO AN INCREASE
IN PRODUCTIVITY
price
0 Quantity
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if demand for the product is not perfectly elastic (Fig. 3.4), an 
increase in productivity (S to S^ ) will lower the price from OP to 
OP^. The total benefits of the productivity increase are represented 
by the shaded area.
Consumers gain by the increase in consumer surplus brought 
about by the fall in price from OP to OP^, while the producers' gain 
the difference between the shaded area and the consumers' gain.
If the supply curve shifts from to S due to a research 
levy, producers do not bear all the costs of the levy, as part of the 
cost is passed on to consumers in the form of the price rise. In this 
case (Fig. 3.4), if some of the consumers are overseas not all the 
benefits from the productivity increase accrue to Australians. However, 
if the research is financed by a levy, overseas consumers will also 
bear the costs of research in the same proportion as they share in the 
benefits.
By using the standard model explained above, estimates of 
the proportional distribution of research benefits can be easily made. 
The consumers' share (a) of the benefit of reduced production costs is 
determined by the ratio^ " :
e-n (1)
where,
e = the elasticity of supply 
f| = the elasticity of demand
1 See Greg Martin (1977) for the derivation of this formula.
FIGURE 3.4
SOCIAL GAINS RESULTING FROM AN INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVITY
price
Quantity
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Let us now take a situation where production is consumed 
both domestically and overseas, and given no distortions in pricing 
in either market (such as two-price schemes), domestic prices will be 
determined by export prices. So, the elasticity of world demand for 
Australian products rather than the elasticity of Australian (domestic) 
demand is the relevant elasticity; under this assumption the change 
in price of the product resulting from a reduction in unit costs can 
be estimated as follows: 
eS
APP ____aeD-eSa
(2)
where,
eD = the elasticity of world
eS = the elasticity of supply in respect of Australian producers3.
Since consumers benefit only through a fall in prices 
(ignoring quality changes), the proportion of benefits flowing from 
the reduction in unit costs is the percentage fall in product prices.
Domestic producers, given the previous assumptions, are 
the only other beneficiaries and hence their proportion is (in percent­
age terms) 100 minus the percentage accruing to consumers.
The proportion of the total benefit flowing to consumers is 
divided between Australian and overseas consumers on the basis of the 
proportion of total production consumed by each.
The I.A.C. obtains world demand and "other country" supply 
elasticities from UNCTAD (1974) and in general the Australian supply
elasticities are those of Gruen (1964).
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According to the I.A.C. report, the elasticity of demand 
facing the Australian exporters (as a general proposition) is a function 
of the elasticity of world demand for the product, the elasticity of 
supply of Australian production and the elasticity of supply of other 
producing countries assuming a free world market, homogeneous products 
and arbitrage between markets. The elasticity of world demand for an 
Australian product (eD ) is determined by the world elasticity of
cl
demand (eD) and the elasticity of supply of other countries (eSC). So,
^d OCeD = eD.—  - eSC.—  .........(3)a Q Qa a
Q , Q and QC represent world production, Australian production andQ 3
other countries' production respectively. This approach, however, assumes 
that Australian producers compete with all producers throughout the 
world, not only those who export. So, to account for self-sufficient 
countries and protection in importing countries, a separate model for 
the relevant commodities is used, where eD^ is the elasticity of world 
demand for Australian production within the restricted free-trade area.
eDr eSc (4)
The terms QE , QE and QE represent the quantities traded w a c
in the world, the quantity exported by Australia, and the quantity 
exported by other countries respectively.
The models will reduce to the following equations (5 and 6) 
if we use proportions rather than quantites:
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100 100-PP (free market assumption model)
(5)
where PP is the proportion of world production produced in Australia.
3 .
and,
100 100-PE- eS (protected market assumption model)
...........(6 )
where PE is the world trade proportion (total exports) contributed by3
Australia.
The shares of production and trade are derived principally 
from B.A.E. publications.
The distributive estimates of direct benefits between pro­
ducer and consumer can be shown in Table 3.3.
3.5 Comparison of Ayer and Schuh and I.A.C. Methodology for Analysis 
of Distribution of Net Social Gains to Research
Both studies use a shift in the supply curve of a commodity 
to look at the distribution of the benefits of research. Ayer and Schuh 
use the shift to represent increased productivity of new varieties of 
cotton, while in the I.A.C. report the shift represents a general re­
duction in unit costs of production for each agricultural commodity 
due to research. The formulation of the supply and demand models differ 
between the two reports. Ayer and Schuh's supply curves are exponential 
in form, so that a supply shift is not parallel and the reduction in 
costs is greater at the margin than infra-marginally. The I.A.C. uses 
a simple, linear model with a parallel supply shift.
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TABLE 3.3
Distribution of the Direct Benefits of Rural Research
Australian
Producer
Consumer Nature of
Export
Australian Overseas Market
% % %
Wool 85 to 88 s 11 to 15 Free
Beef and Veal 74 to 88 6 to 13 6 to 13 Protected
Wheat* 67 to 90 s 8 to 28 Free
Coarse Grains 94 to 99 s s Free
Rice 99 s s Free
Mutton and Lamb 58 to 68 25 to 32 7 to 10 Protected
Pig Meat 83 17 0 Protected
Manufactured Dairy 
Products* 97 to 98 1 to 3 s Protected
Sugar* 91 to 93 s 5 to 7 Protected
s = small (less than 5%)
* = ignores effect of two price schemes, see Table 3.4 (Comparison
of Ayer and Schuh and I.A.C. Methodology, Section 3.5).
Source: Industries Assistance Commission Report (1976).
Further aspects of this study will be discussed in Section 3.5.
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From Duncan and Tisdell (1971) we know these cases 
influence benefits achieved by producers, being greater in the I.A.C. 
case than for Ayer and Schuh1s model, given similar demand elasticity 
for both. A further difference in the models used is that Ayer and 
Schuh chose a dynamic model (Fig. 3.2), while the I.A.C. uses a static 
model (Figs 3.3 and 3.4) with equilibrium prices and quantity. This 
changes the particular areas which represent consumers' and producers' 
surplus. In Ayer and Schuh's case of an essentially cobweb cycle 
formulation the resulting yearly average size of these areas will be 
a function of the elasticities of the supply and demand functions and, 
inter alia, will depend on whether the cycle is converging or diverging.
Ayer and Schuh estimate the distribution of gains directly 
for both producers and consumers by integrating relevant areas under 
the defined curves. The I.A.C. report, however, given linear demand 
and supply curves derives a relationship for price fall in terms of 
the elasticity of supply as a ratio of the difference of demand and 
supply elasticities, i.e.,
This difference in distributive estimates of benefits should not be 
important as a fall in price represents consumer benefit, so the per­
centage (proportionate) price fall is taken to be the percentage 
(proportion) of benefit flowing to consumers. Producer benefit is 
then obtained by difference (compare with Ayer and Schuh's direct esti­
mate of producer benefit).
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The I.A.C. report extends its analysis to export situa­
tions with perfect and imperfect competition. According to the report, 
free market competition in export markets is an important factor deter­
mining the proportion of benefits accruing to Australian producers and 
consumers. For beef and dairy products, for example, Australia competes 
freely only with other exporting countries since most importing 
countries protect their domestic industry. According, the following
QEw QEcequation (eD = eD . --- - eS ---) which uses trade weights isr QE c QE3d  d
employed when calculating the elasticity of demand for Australian exports
of these protected products. As was discussed earlier in Section 3.4,
the terms QC , QE and QE represent the quantities traded in the world, w a c
the quantity exported by Australia and the quantity exported by other 
countries respectively. For other products, such as wheat and wool, 
Australian producers compete freely against producers in both the 
exporting and importing countries. For these products the following 
equation which uses production weights is employed:
Recall that eD and eS represent the world elasticity of demand andc
the elasticity of supply of other countries respectively; Q , Q and
Q  cl
represent world production, Australian production and other countries 
production respectively.
Ayer and Schuh's study sees the effect on export earnings 
to be an important benefit of Brazil's research program on cotton.
They make a rough estimate of the effect of the breeding program on
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exports by estimating domestic utilization of cotton during a recent 
period of time and compare it with an estimate of what cotton fibre 
production would have been if new varieties had not been available.
They argue that if production would have been less than domestic utili­
zation, then any exports of cotton fibre is due to the new varieties 
having replaced the unimproved ones.
Ayer and Schuh base this analysis on data from the period 
1955 to 1967 (13 years), since prior to this period stocks and exports 
had often violently fluctuated. Average production of southern Brazil 
cotton fibre within the above period has been 343 thousand tons; and 
average exports of southern Brazil cotton fibre for this period have 
been 123 thousand tons. Thus, the difference (220 thousand tons) con­
stitutes average domestic utilization.
The average production of cotton fibre (using the old 
varieties) can be estimated from the above calculations of average 
production and the productivity factor K which is the percentage 
reduction in cotton fibre production if old varieties replaced the 
improved ones. Production with the less favourable seed would be 
(1-K) times the production actually obtained if the improved seed is 
used. K, on average, has been .49 for the 13 year period and 1-K 
equals .51. Hence, average production using the poor varieties could 
have been approximately 175 thousand tons (.51 x 343,000 tons).
Since production of 175 thousand tons cannot satisfy the 
estimated domestic utilization of 220 thousand tons, then the impli­
cation is that Brazil would be a net importer of cotton. Alternatively,
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Ayer and Schuh conclude that the cotton fibre exports from Southern 
Brazil which actually did occur from 1955 to 1967 may be chiefly 
attributed to the use of improved varieties of cotton seed.
The I.A.C. estimates presented in Table 3.3 (see Section 3.4) 
are subject to two practical qualifications. Firstly, in cases where 
bilateral trade agreements (which exclude Australia) form a signifi­
cant proportion of world trade, the proportion of benefits which accrue 
to Australian producers is likely to be over-estimated. Exclusion of 
Australia from some export markets has similar implications. In other 
words, the effect of the trade barriers against Australian exports on 
the distribution of the benefits will depend partly on the form of 
the trade barriers. These are important in regard to sugar and dairy 
products. However, in the case of the wheat industry, the above esti­
mates may be too low. The analysis presented by Alouze, Watson and 
Sturgess^ (1976) of Australia's role in the world wheat market suggests 
that Australia will face a perfectly elastic demand curve in most years. 
This indicates that, in the absence of two-price schemes, Australian 
wheat producers would receive almost 100 per cent of the benefits of 
research which reduces the unit costs of wheat production.
Secondly, the effect of two-price schemes (as exist for 
wheat, dairy products, and sugar) have been ignored. As domestic 
prices under such schemes are usually determined independently of 
export prices, then the possible price effects of unit cost reduction
1 C.M. Alouze, A .S. Watson, N.H. Sturgess, "Storage Policy for the
Australian Wheat Industry", paper presented to the Annual Conference 
of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society, Armidale, 1976.
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are not certain when such schemes are included in the analysis. Never­
theless, it is possible that domestic consumers gain some benefits 
from productivity increases in the process of price-setting for the 
domestic market.
When the fall in price (paid by domestic consumers) equals 
the amount of the unit cost reduction, the distribution of research 
benefits which bring down the unit costs of producing wheat, dairy 
products and sugar is estimated to be as shown in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4
Maximum Effect of Two-Price Schemes 
on Distribution of Direct Benefits to Rural Research
Australian
Producers
Consumer
Australian Overseas
Nature of 
Export 
Market
% % %
Wheat 57 to 76 16 8 to 27 Free
Dairy Products 31 68 s Protected
Sugar 74 25 s Protected
s = small (less than 5 per cent)
Source: Industries Assistance Commission Report (1976).
Only in the case of dairy products does the presence of 
two-price schemes change significantly the distribution of research 
benefits in favour of domestic consumers. However, with the presence 
of two-price schemes for dairy products, the Australian consumer is
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worse off to begin with (since domestic prices are higher than the 
prices paid by overseas consumers of Australian production). The 
above qualifications are important but do not change the general con­
clusion that Australian producers obtain more than half of the benefits 
from production-oriented research. Overseas consumers receive signifi­
cant benefits from Australian research in the case of wool, wheat and 
meat.
The methodology employed in this analysis is partial, 
i.e. ignoring general equilibrium considerations. Research results 
which benefit producers and consumers of one commodity affect producers 
and consumers in other industries. Firstly, there will be second- 
round price effects. For instance, to the extent to which cost re­
ductions lead to a fall in beef prices the price of substitutes, i.e. 
mutton and lamb will also fall. So, producers and consumers in those 
markets are affected. However, in the case of beef and sheep meats, 
export markets have traditionally been separate. Therefore, the degree 
of substitutability is likely to be low and the second-round effects 
small.
For products principally consumed on the domestic market, 
i.e., pork and poultry, the second-round effects are likely to be more 
significant.
In the long-run, overseas producers of rural products may 
also benefit if research results in Australia are transferable to them. 
Development of mechanised sugar cane harvesting provides an example 
of Australian research results which are benefiting overseas producers
also.
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Distribution of the benefits resulting from the cotton 
breeding program of Sao Paulo in Brazil may be realised by producers, 
consumers, or both. The proportion which goes to producers is defined 
as the difference in producer surplus using improved varieties versus 
unimproved varieties. With reference to Fig. 3.2, the change in pro­
ducer surplus can be shown by (OABP^ - OAD) - (OEFP^ - OEG). The 
change in consumer surplus is P^BC “ P3FC or P2BFP3* Estimates °f 
these areas are based on the price elasticites of demand and supply 
which were -5.3 and -.944 respectively. Ayer and Schuh used the same 
procedure of collapsing the equations into two dimensions, price and 
quantity, to obtain annual estimates of the areas.
The results indicate that producers have realised the 
largest share of the social gains from cotton seed research. Producers 
received 60 per cent of total social gains in the form of producer 
surpluses and consumers obtained 40 per cent of total gains as consumer 
surpluses. Obviously, the relative price elasticities of demand and 
supply is the key to this division.
Ayer and Schuh argue that the "qualitative-quantitative" 
analysis of distribution of the producer benefits among the factors 
of production suggests that the large amount of the benefits of the 
new technology were realized, at least as first-order effects, as a 
producer surplus. The reason why an important part of the benefits 
channelled to consumers was mainly due to government restrictions on 
exports. On the production side, the benefits went to land owners as 
capital gains and to the owners of relatively insufficient entrepre­
neurial skills, who obtained an economic rent in the form of higher
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incomes. The labour force benefited from the creation of additional 
employment. However, due to the labour market conditions (i.e. the 
large degree of unemployment) a fraction of the benefits of the new 
technology in increasing productivity appears to have been realized as 
higher real wages. Workers perhaps benefited from the reduction in 
the real price of cotton cloth.
The studies by Ayer and Schuh and the I.A.C. have been 
important in widening the scope of what has hitherto been the conven­
tional wisdom, i.e. that, in the main, the gains from agricultural 
research flow to consumers. This conclusion is derived from analysis of 
market behaviour in the U.S. where the domestic price is directly 
affected by changes in supply conditions. However, in countries such 
as Australia and Brazil, traditional exporters of agricultural products, 
the "small country" assumption is generally appropriate, and in such 
cases producers are likely to appropriate a large share of the gains 
from agricultural research.
Finally, if Wisecarver's arguments are generally accepted, 
the analytical approach to these distributional questions will have to 
be made through the factor-demand functions. Use of these functions 
will pose questions about the specification of "appropriate" functional 
forms for the demand and supply curves and specification of shifts in 
the functions as well as estimation of the areas of surplus (loss).
These are problems which are still unresolved in the use of output 
supply and demand curves as we will see in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
SPECIFICATION PROBLEMS
Scobie (1976), in a summary of some of the methodology 
which has been used to measure relative gains of producers and consumers, 
notes that markedly different distributions can result from different 
specifications of product supply and demand curves, and the producer 
and consumer surplus formulations which derive from them. He examines 
the formulae for consumer and producer surplus used by Akino and 
Hayami (1975), Hertford and Schmitz (1975), Ardila (1973), and Ramalko 
de Castro and Schuh (1976).
Scobie points out that the formulae for consumer and pro­
ducer surplus will vary depending on the nature of the supply and 
demand curves assumed, e.g. constant elasticity, variable elasticity, 
etc., and the degree of approximation used in measuring the areas of 
surplus.
Scobie compared the results obtained from four different 
mathematical formulations of consumers' and producers' surplus in 
response to the following questions:
(1) Under what conditions will consumers gain more 
than producers as a result of a technological 
change in production (i.e. a rightwards shift 
of the supply curve)?
(2) Under what conditions will the change in 
producers' surplus be positive?
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The four sets of formulae which Scobie presented in his 
note have been used in published studies of the distribution of the 
benefits from research between consumers and producers. The answers 
he obtains in each case are different and in some cases, contradictory. 
Scobie sees that the various mathematical specifications of the con­
sumers' and producers' surplus differ in the specification of the 
demand and supply curves (e.g. log linear versus linear), and in the 
degree of approximation used in measuring the consumers' and producers' 
surplus. Nevertheless, as he says, "we may expect that, despite all 
the differences, the same general conclusion would emerge".
In this chapter we attempt to isolate the reasons why the 
different formulations of the consumers' and producers' surplus give 
different results. This is done by developing a generalised specifi­
cation of a supply and demand model and incorporating a generalised 
shift of the supply function to represent, in this case, reduced costs 
of production resulting from research. Generalised formulae for both 
consumers' surplus and producers' surplus are developed. The various 
specifications assembled by Scobie, are seen to be special cases of 
the generalised formulation, and the reasons for the different results 
from a shift of the supply curve can be isolated. However detailed 
reappraisal of the studies prompting Scobie's questions cannot be 
undertaken here because the original data bases are not available.
The reasons are, in fact, three-fold: first, the shift
in the supply curve may be specified differently; second, the specifi­
cation of the supply and demand functions adopted may be different; 
third, the approximation of the point elasticities may be different.
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4.1 Rightwards Shifts in the Supply Curve
Suppose X (output) is a dependent variable, and P (price) 
is an independent variable. Then a supply function can be represented 
generally as:
Xg = S(P)
A proportionate shift to the right in supply (in either 
linear or non-linear form) is defined by:
X^ E KS(P), where K > 1 and constant.
In this case, supply increases by a constant proportion for all prices
For a parallel rightwards shift in the supply function 
the supply of X increases by an equal absolute amount for all prices.
For example, in a linear supply function a parallel shift 
is specified as follows:
Xs = a + bP
Xg = a ' + bP where a' > a.
For a combination of these two kinds of shift we can postu 
late, for example, a rotation of a linear function, where:
X = a + bP S
X ' = a + b 'P where b ' > b .S
This will give the same result as in the proportionate
shift case if, and only if, a = 0.
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For a generalised specification of a rightwards shift in 
the supply function, we define
{(P,X)/VP X' > x}
{ (P,X)/VP S ' (P) > S(P) }
This can be called a "strong" shift, i.e. for all prices
If we define X' = {(P,X)/VP S'(P > S(P)}, this can be 5
called a "semi-positive" shift, i.e. for some prices X' > X .
Id  d
Finally, for purposes of completeness, if we define 
Xg = {(P,X)/VP S'(P) > S(P)} this can be called a "weak" shift. In this 
case X^ = X^ can satisfy the "weak" inequality above.
4.2 Definition of Producers1 Surplus
In the general case, assuming X^ is integrable and the 
inverse function Xg 1 exists (i.e. Xg is one-to-one and "onto"), pro­
ducers' surplus (PS) will be equal to:
X^
 ^ -1PS = P X ~ f s (X) dX, where P , X represents any price/
0
quantity co-ordinate on the supply function.
4.3 Comparative Static Effect of a Change in K
To derive the effect on producers' surplus from a shift in 
the supply curve we move to a market specification and assume supply
and demand functions, as follows:
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Xg = S (P , K)
and = D(P), where in equilibrium
Xs - XD
and where, D(P) - S(P,K) = 0 ........ (1)"'"
Assuming that this equilibrium exists, and if demand and supply functions 
are continuously differentiable and an equilibrium price P exists, then 
there is a (continuously differentiable) function g defined in some 
neighbourhood of (P,K) such that:
P* = g (K)  (2)
also, solving for X* by substitution in either 
demand function: X* - D(P*) = D(g(K))
or supply function: X* = S(P*,K) = S(g(K),K)
e.g. in a linear case X* = d + eP*
, . (d-a-cK)= d + e — -----b-e
Now,
X* = S (P* , K) = D (P*) ........ (3)
where P* and X* are equilibrium price and quantity respectively.
2From the implicit function Theorem we find the effect on 
the equilibrium of a "small" change in K. Equation (1) is an identity 
in the equilibrium values of the variable P*. Hence,
3D (P*) - S (P* ,K) 0 ........ (4)
2
3
e.g. in a linear case when supply in a function of price P and a shift 
parameter K,
Xg = a + bP + CK and Xß = d + eP, (e < 0)
Then X_ = X^S D
If we substitute for X^ and Xg :
d + eP - (a+bP+CK) a+CK-d0, then P* = — — or (e-b)
d-a-CK
(b-e)
For further details see "Mathematical Optimization and Economic 
Theory", 1971, pp. 499-500, by M. Intriligator.
The equilibrium equation (4) is an identity:
(contd. over)
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Footnote 3 (contd.)
D (P*) - S(P*,K) E 0
Now if we differentiate "implicitly" taking into account that P*
(not P) is a function of K alone, because we now confine attention to 
equilibrium values of P, X only.
9p dP* _ 9s_ dP* 9s_ dK
9P ' dK 9P K + 9k * dK
9d 9s , dP* 9s or [x—  - 7~ ]9p 9p K 9k (A)
3d 3s 3sThe derivatives of the demand and supply functions (i.e. -r— , 7—  and -r— )dP dP dK
are all evaluated at the equilibrium value P*. To make this clear, 
let us write:
5? 5 Vp‘>'
If = S (P*,K)dP pand H 5 Sk <P*'K>
Therefore, rewriting the equation (A), we have
[D (P*) - S (P* ,K) ] - S^(P*,K) = 0P p K K
this is therefore linear in dP*
Therefore, if we solve: 
dP* s k (p*'k)
D (P*)-S (P*,K) P p
(B)
(S is the partial derivative of S with respect to K.)K
dP* —ce.g. in a linear model: -—  = :--- , directly from explicit------  dK b-e
solution for P*,
or, in equilibrium condition:
d + eP - (A + bP + CK) = 0
and e dP* - (bdP* d K ,dK . + CdK
sf +
P SK
0 therefore, dP* -ce-b
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Assuming the demand and supply curves are differentiable, we 
differentiate (2) with respect to K which gives:
S*dP* K
dK D* - S*P P
(5) 1
where * indicates evaluation at equilibrium (to save writing S (P*,K)K
etc). If it is the case that demand is negatively related to price, 
supply is positively related to price (i.e. the "normal" assumption 
made in micro-theory); and in addition, an increase in K increases 
supply, then:
D* < 0 ,  S* > 0, and S* > 0 P P K
Therefore, from (5), under these conditions:
—  is negative since the numerator in (5) is positive, and
the denominator is negative. We can write result (5) in terms of
P*elasticities if we multiply numerator and denominator by —— . ThisX
gives:
dP*
dK ^  s j / (a*-n*) ,
v?here
a* P* D*p (price elasticity of demand), and
4 For example, in the special case of proportionate shift: 
Xg = S (P ,K) = Kh(P) •* (supply is linear in K)
Now, 9s3P
as
9k
Khp(P) (1st derivation) 
h (P)
If we substitute these into (B), we will get dP* h(P*)Dp (P*)-Khp (P*)
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p*
H* = —  S* (price elasticity of supply) X P
Using these results we can now evaluate a change in 
producers' surplus consequent on a small change in K. If we 
differentiate the equation for producers' surplus above, evaluated 
at equilibrium, we have
dPS
dK
ax*P* —  +dK
dP* X * -1 
J S* (X)dX (7)
Theorem: Let f(x,t) satisfy the conditions for Leibnitz's rule. In
addition, let a(t) and b(t) be defined and have continuous deriva­
tives for t < t < t^. Then, for t^ < t <
d b (t) b(t)~
—  f f (x,t) dx = f [b (t) , t] b ' (t) - f [a(t) , t] a '(t) + / (x,t) dxdt /4_n ,.,ota(t) a(t)
If we apply the result arising from the above theorem to 
the last term in (7) we have:
if ■s*+* i* - I*+f r1« “
{p* - s* 1 (X*) } + x*(p*/x*) S*K _ f ( 9£) dx --- (9)dK G*_ri* dK
dx* p*s?(p* - p*) —  + — -dK a*-n*
X* -s*
-  f d x0 P
----(10)
P*S* X* s*
^  + { i dx0 P —  (11)
Equation (11) shows that the change in the producers' 
surplus as a result of a small rightwards shift of the supply curve is
the net effect of:
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P* S *K dP*(i) --■ = X* —— , which is the loss in revenueO*-0* dK
resulting from the fall in the equilibrium price due to the right­
wards shift in supply; and
X* S* X* (_3p)(ii) / d X = / ^X, which is the aggregate
of the reduction in marginal costs (i.e. fall in total costs) as a 
result of the adoption of the cost-reducing technology.
This is the familiar result, as expressed in Figure 4.1 
below, that the change in producers' surplus from a shift of the supply 
curve is the difference between the total change in consumers' and 
producers' surplus ee^fg and the change in consumers' surplus pee^p^.
FIGURE 4.1
SOCIAL RETURN FROM A PARALLEL SUPPLY SHIFT
Price
quantity
91
4.4 Change in Consumers' Surplus
Consumers' surplus (CS) is defined as follows:
, -1CS = / D (X) dX - P*X*
0
If we also define P = g (X) D ^ (X) , then
X*
CS = / g(X) dX - P*X* .........(12)
0
Differentiating (12) with respect to K, gives the change 
in consumers' surplus in response to a small change in K, which is
dCS
dK g (X*)
dX*
dK since P* = g(X*)
and substituting (6) into the above gives:
P*S* ___K
G * - r i *
(13)
Equation (13) can now be compared with equation (11) to see that the 
change in consumers' surplus resulting from a shift of the supply curve 
is equal to the negative of the first term of equation (11) which is 
the change in producers' total revenue as a direct result of the change 
in price. Other familiar results can also be observed such as, for 
example, when 0=°°, o < r | < ° ° ;  ö = o ,  o < r ) < ° ° .
4.5 Comparisons with Scobie's Results
We can now provide generalised responses to the questions
which Scobie posed.
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(a) Under what conditions will consumers gain more than 
producers? i.e. when is:
dCS dPS 
dK dK
This will be true when:
-X* dP*dK > X*
dP*
dK
X*
+ /
0
( -9p) 
O k) dx
i.e. -X* dP*dK
(-Op)
O k) dx, which is true when the consumers' gain
is more than one-half the producers' gain from the reduction in marginal
costs.
(b) Under what conditions will the change in producers'
surplus be positive? i.e. dPS*dK
This will be true when:
ap*  ^r <-3p> nx o
X* (-9P) dP*i.e. when f ,^ \ dx > (-X* -r-  ), which is true when the producers' OK) dK ^
gain from the aggregate of the reduction in marginal costs is greater 
than their transfer of surplus to consumers.
This general approach to the formulation of these conditions 
has been carried out using exact, calculus results. It is, therefore,
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difficult to reconcile these with the formulations reported by Scobie 
because these are mostly approximate results where, for example, point 
elasticities are approximated by arc elasticities.
It would be extremely difficult to reconcile these different 
mathematical approaches. (Moreover, the initial specifications of the 
functions are not available to the author). However, inspection shows 
that other than the difference in elasticity formulation mentioned 
above, the other major differences in approach between the several 
authors are in the specification of the shift of the supply curve 
(sometimes horizontal, sometimes vertical) and the different initial 
conditions adopted. It is therefore not obvious that the different 
formulations should be condemned because they give different and often 
contradictory results. The proper question is what is the appropriate 
supply and demand specification for the problem at hand? It would 
help however, if there was some standardisation in terms of the general
approach adopted here.
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CHAPTER 5
DISTRIBUTION OF THE GAINS (LOSSES) FROM RESEARCH 
AMONG FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
5.1 Introduction
It seems a natural progression of events that following 
work on the estimation of the distribution of research gains (losses) 
among producers and consumers that there should be interest in the 
distribution of the change in producers' surplus among the factors of 
production. In the only major analysis of its kind so far Schmitz and 
Seckler (1970) attempted to look at the implications for agricultural 
labour of the advent of the mechanical tomato harvester in the U.S..
The major implication of their analysis is to determine 
the value of the innovation to producers and consumers, and to see 
what would be the payments necessary to compensate the loser (i.e. 
workers).
There are a number of major aspects on which this study 
can be criticised. It is to be hoped that some of these criticisms 
point the way in which the methodology used here can be improved.
5.2 Schmitz and Seckler*s Method
In the first analysis of its kind, Andrew Schmitz and
4
David Seckler (1970) attempt to supply a framework by which "The broad 
social costs of technological innovation can be mapped into the frame­
work of economic analysis". They concentrate on one of the recent
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technological changes influencing agriculture - the mechanical tomato 
harvester, which brought about considerable social changes as well as 
being a scientific and engineering triumph.
Schmitz and Seckler employ "gross social returns" (GSR) 
as the Value to society of the reduced costs of harvesting tomatoes 
by the mechanical harvester.^ These returns (GSR) are defined to 
differ from the "net social returns" (NSR) by the value of the wage 
loss of the displaced workers.
Studies of the comparative costs of hand and mechanical 
tomato harvesting methods carried out in California are used for other 
tomato-producing states. It was estimated that mechanical harvesting 
reduced costs roughly between $5.41/ton and $7.47/ton (including 
amortization and 6 per cent interest charges on the machine costs).
In order to estimate GSR (as a whole), firstly, they employ 
as a basis the supply-shift frame-work used by Griliches, Peterson and 
others. Secondly, they deem it necessary to take into account the 
rate of adoption of the harvester.
Given the estimated total U.S. average rate of adoption and 
an estimated average yield of tomatoes/acre, they compute the GSR to 
the harvester for the United States. All estimates are carried to a 
definite year (being 1973) in which, by assumption, total tomato 
acreage mechanically harvested attains a constant amount. The annual 
GSR, for each year, is calculated at 6 per cent interest to 1973 (the 
year 1965 being the base year) and then they convert it into an annual
1 They neglect benefits accruing to foreign countries (e.g. Germany, 
the U.S.S.R.) which have imported these machines.
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perpetual sum. This, together with the annual GSR in 1973 onwards, 
establishes the annual value of GSR to the harvester.
Rate of Return
Given the estimated benefits accruing from the tomato 
harvester and the research and development costs, they calculate the 
gross social rate of return (GSRR) to R and D costs as follows:
GSRR _______Total annual value of gross social returns______Research and development costs (on the tomato harvester) (100)
Gross social returns to aggregate research and development 
expenditures in this analysis are in the vicinity of 1000 per cent.
They follow "traditional analysis" to calculate the rates 
of return from an innovation in which the distributional effects are 
not taken into account. Then in estimating the NSRR, they relax this 
assumption and consider explicitly the costs incurred by workers due 
to the adoption of the tomato harvester.
Net Social Rate of Return (NSRR)
The formula used to compute the NSRR^ is:
GSR — CNSRR = ---- -—  (100), where C is the amount of compensation which isR and D ^
2needed to offset the effect of technological change. They conclude
1 They assume different employment levels for farm workers in non- 
agricultural industries, but in the unhelpful way of sensitivity 
levels ranging from 0 to 100%.
2 For detailed calculations, see Appendix to the paper "Total man-hours 
displaced by the tomato-harvester".
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that the rates of return to R and D expenditures on the tomato harvester 
were considerable (even after deducting reasonable allowances for com­
pensation) . However, since compensation was not actually paid, "they 
believe" it cannot be true that the society as a whole has benefited 
from the tomato harvester.
Purpose and Framework of Analysis
The mechanical tomato harvester has made possible important 
economies in production. However, Schmitz and Seckler also see that it 
"has also undermined the livelihood of numerous agricultural laborers".
This is a very important matter not only as far as the adoption of new 
technology is concerned, but generally in respect of all structural change. 
The assumption that labour is automatically rendered unemployed by 
labour displacing new technology should be questioned. Are the labourers 
really worse-off? Do they go on directly to unemployment relief? Or, 
are there other jobs they can go to? New technology does not necessarily 
disadvantage labour. It often leads to new and higher paid occupations.
In a survey of the employment effects of technological 
change in Australian manufacturing industry,'*' taken by the Department 
of Labour and National Service in 1971, the following results give us 
some interesting aspects regarding structural change:
- 73 per cent of the 2,200 responding establishments (employing more 
than half a million persons) introduced one or more technological
1 National Survey of the Employment Effects of Technological Change, 
Department of Labour and National Service, Melbourne, 1971.
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changes during the previous three years, while 60 per cent were 
expecting to introduce changes during the subsequent three years.^
- of the 10,000 persons (1.8 per cent of average employment in the 
responding establishments) displaced by technological changes, 
about 7,000 were transferred to other jobs within the firm (almost 
invariably to positions of equal or higher status).
- Further, in respect of the changing structure of occupations 
accompanying the technological change, 409 establishments experi­
enced occupations declining in relative importance, 668 experienced 
occupations increasing in relative importance and 563 experienced 
the emergence of new occupations. Besides, about 6 out of every
10 establishments which displaced employees provided some sort of 
retraining, at the expense of the company, to make persons suitable 
for alternative employment within the company.
The above survey findings give us reasonable grounds to 
draw the following implications:
(1) Whatever the reasons for the firsm adopting new 
technology, and supposedly it is profitable for them to do so, 
technological change is a very pervasive influence for change in 
industry (this survey understates the extent of change due to new 
technology because it excludes new products).
(2) Technological change is not as important a source 
of "retrenchment of labour" as is widely thought.
1 Technological change was defined as "the introduction of machinery, 
equipment, processes or sales materials of a type not used previously 
by the establishment".
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(3) As far as labour is concerned an important conse­
quence is the generation of new kinds of employment. This is an 
important point which should be borne in mind in relation to structural 
change as it affects labour.
(4) Firms obviously have an incentive to retrain labour 
of their own accord.
A more realistic framework for examining the implications 
of new technology for labour (or other causes of structural change) 
would be to think of the problem in terms of labour's expected life­
time earnings and the effect of new technology on the expected value 
of earnings. This approach would mean taking into account the likely 
occurrence of workers changing jobs several times during their working 
life - involving with each change the possibility of larger or smaller 
incomes being earned. The approach should recognise that because 
change is part of economic life, workers do have expectations of 
changing jobs. Moreover, as was argued above, technological change 
carries with it the high likelihood of the creation of new job 
opportunities. Because workers in a displaced occupation possess 
experience of that particular industry, it is likely that they will be 
chosen before others for further on-the-job training to adapt them for 
new occupations.
Estimation of the Effects of Technical Change on Labour
To compute the net social rate of return generated from 
the harvester development, Schmitz and Seckler explicitly take into
account the effects of its introduction of farm workers. After analysing
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the Gross Social Returns through the supply shift approach, they turn 
to input-demand analysis for estimating the effects in the labour 
market on labour demand. In Fig. 5.1, prior to mechanization the 
demand for tomato workers is and the supply is S^.D^D^ represents 
the demand for tomato workers when the harvester is in use. The loss 
of wages caused by the harvester is assumed to be equal to *
This assumption takes the following form:
(i) No possibilities of alternative employment;
(ii) The remaining employed workers receive wages 
at least as high as those obtained before 
the implementation of the harvester. This 
assumption does not stand up well to close 
analysis.
If we look to Fig. 5.1 as presented by Schmitz and Seckler, 
we realize that this representation actually does not make any sense. 
The supply curve for labour represents the opportunity cost of labour 
(that is, what labour could get in an alternative activity), in a free 
market. Only in the case where institutional wage fixing predominates 
may the level of labour demand move from A to B. In this case, the 
wage level is essentially the labour supply curve. In which case
the supply curve is inoperative. However, it should seriously be 
questioned whether, in the particular case they were analysing, this 
representation of pricing in the labour market was accurate. Even if 
institutional wage-fixing predominates, the labour-supply conditions 
must bear some influence on wages. Given a large displacement of 
labour in agriculture, is it not more realistic to believe that this 
will exert some downwards pressure on wages and hence the number of
FIGURE 5.1
EFFECT OF THE TOMATO HARVESTER ON EMPLOYMENT OF FARM WORKERS
wage
rate
Number of workers
Source: Schmitz and Seckler (1970)
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workers displaced will be less? (This leaves aside the question of 
whether the tomato harvester in fact created opportunities for new 
jobs, in agriculture or elsewhere).
In Fig. 5.2, I have shown a situation such that, if is 
the supply curve, then CDQ^Q^ will be the total area to be measured 
(for loss of wages). Alternatively, if is the supply curve (as 
Schmitz and Seckler have shown), then D'Q^Q^C' should be the area for 
the measurement of loss of wages.
One of the many aspects of the discussion in the previous 
paragraph which could have borne further discussion by Schmitz and 
Seckler was of the effect of minimum wage fixing in general and in 
particular with respect to wage fixing in agriculture in the U.S..
Given an institutional wage-setting process for minimum 
wages, it may well set wages above what would otherwise have been sus­
tained in a free market. Presumably the existence of such an 
institutional mechanism is a policy favoured, in some sense, by society.
In that case, individual employers should not be expected to carry the 
full burden of compensation if it is to be as represented by Schmitz 
and Seckler in Fig. 5.1.
5.3 Minimum Wage Implications
Jacob Mincer (1976) explores the analytical and empirical 
differences between employment and unemployment effects of minimum wages. 
His discussion is relevant to Schmitz and Seckler's analysis in estimating 
the actual amount of unemployment caused by the implementation of the
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FIGURE 5.2
EFFECTS OF THE TOMATO HARVESTER ON EMPLOYMENT OF FARM WORKERS 
WITH BOTH PERFECTLY ELASTIC SUPPLY AND INELASTIC SUPPLY
wage
rate
Number of workers
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tomato harvester. Since Schmitz and Seckler assume wages for the 
remaining employed pickers at least as high as those obtained prior to 
the use of the harvester, they should have gone into the discussion of 
problems associated with unemployment effects of minimum wages.
The theoretical analysis indicates that minimum wages
generate socially wasteful labour mobility between the "covered" and
non-covered sectors and between the labour market and the non-market.
The direction of this mobility and of the resulting change in the non-
covered sector wage are not predictable a priori contrary to (conflicting)
assumptions made in the literature. The empirical analysis suggests
that, in consequence of minimum wage increases, labour moves out of the
covered sector into the non-covered sector and out of the labour market.
In the process, wages in the uncovered sector fall. Now, given similar
labour in the two sectors (there is only one before the imposition of
minimum wages) and a wage W^, the imposition of an above-equilibrium
minimum wage (W ) in the covered sector, where W > W . will lead to m m 0
two equilibrating adjustments: in the uncovered sector, the wage
changes from to in consequence of general sectoral movements of
labour, and with W > W a certain amount of "waiting" for jobs in the m n
covered sector becomes worthwhile, which creates a fixed amount of 
unemployment.
Suppose a wage W exceeding the equilibrium wage Vtf is m 0
imposed on a part of the economy, i.e. the "covered" sector, creating
a differential W - W , where W is the resulting wage level in the m n n
"uncovered" sector. Now in order to separate from other influences, 
Mincer assumes that job searchers' probability of finding a job in
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the uncovered sector is equal to unity within the period. With wages
above equilibrium in the covered sector, jobs in it must be rationed.
Changes of success in the job search depend on the method of rationing.
Mincer assumes probabilistic rationing, one in which every job searcher
has an equal chance of getting a job and every employed worker an equal
chance of keeping the job. This assumes that some vacancies emerge
periodically in the covered sector, due to turnover. It should be
noted that in probabilistic rationing search costs are implicitly
assumed to consist of time costs. Becker suggests that the probability
of a worker finding a job (at W ) depends positively on the amount ofm
time he puts into search and negatively on the amount of time put into
search by everyone else. If all workers were identical, then in
equilibrium all persons searching would put in an equal amount of time
and have an equal probability of finding employment. The time they all
put in - which essentially offsets each other - is the unemployment
that is observed. Mincer argues that if we abstract from risk preferences
and from search costs other than foregone earnings, equilibrium wages
after imposition of W in the covered sector are given by:m
1-PPw = w , or P = w /w , and --- = w ........ (1)m n n m P
where W = (W - W )/W and P is the probability of finding employment m n n
in the covered sector.
Mincer goes further into the matter and argues that in the
covered sector, employment is E and the number of vacancies per periodm
is 6e . If we abstract from growth or cycles, the rate 6 is simply a m
separation rate. The ÖE vacancies are filled as soon as they appear,m
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and a remaining pool of unemployed searchers of size U is observed.
As the number of vacancies (separations) is E and the total numberm
of job serachers is U + 6e , then the probability of employment will bem
P
6e____ m
0 + SEm
(2)
Define the covered sector unemployment ratio u' = U/E and the unemploym m
ment rate u = U/(E + U) . Then: m m
P 6u ' + 6m
u' = m
6(1-P)
P 6w (3)
n ö(l-P) 6wand u = —— TTTz— — = -—m P+S(l-P) l+6w
Define the proportion of employment covered k = E /(E + E ) and them m n
aggregate unemployment ratio u' = U/(E + E ). ThenA m n
u ' = k u ' = köw .........(4)A m
and the aggregate unemployment rate uA k6w/(1 + köw).
From above, it appears that the unemployment rate induced 
by the minimum wages imposition is proportional to the percentage wage 
gap (W) between the sectors, the separation rate (6), and the coverage 
ratio (K). The separation rate 6 has a maximum value of unity. This 
case of complete (100 per cent) turnover provides the highest chance
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of success for job searchers, hence maximum unemployment, that is to
say, u' = w and u' = kw. The opposite extreme, zero turnover, m A
implies no unemployment - all those without jobs having left the 
covered section.
5.4 Re-Employment Possibilities
Schmitz and Seckler do not attempt to estimate the actual 
amount of unemployment"^ created by the harvester. Their reason for 
not doing so is that it would have required knowing all displaced pickers' 
future employments. Then they refer to Robinson (1958) who points out, 
"nearly four million workers were employed in 1957 in industries which 
did not exist or hardly existed in 1900. If we had been looking for 
jobs for those workers in 1900, we should never have foreseen the pre­
sent number of workers in the motor industry and motor transport, in 
the making of gramaphones, wireless or television sets, in electricity 
or aviation. At any moment it is hard to foresee how those workers 
will ultimately ab absorbed, for whose services in their former occupa­
tions there is likely to be less demand".
However, Gary S. Fields (1976) presents one specific way 
of estimating probabilities of future employment. This procedure (based 
on current data on job "accessions and terminations") regards the labour 
market as having two states: (a) employment, and (b) unemployment.
Individuals are facing a matrix of probabilities of either remaining 
in or moving between these two states.
1 As it was discussed earlier, this resulted in over-estimation of
compensation and as a consequence of that, NSRR was under-estimated.
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Fields' transition matrix has the form of:
P(t)
p (t) P (t)ee eu
P (i) P (t)ue uu
(B)
where,
. (t) is the probability of moving from state i ’to state j 
during time t.
P^^ is the probability of moving from unemployment (u) to
employment (3) during a period given that one is
unemployed at the beginning of the period (and similarly
for P ) . eu
P (t), P (t) are the probabilities of remaining in uu ee
unemployment and employment states respectively.'*' Fields argues that 
we may suppose that individuals behave as if they take the probabilities 
of present transition and project them into the future as though the 
present values will prevail forever. Now, if we assume that the com­
ponents of the above matrix are constant, then the mechanism which 
determines the probability of employment will be a first order Markov 
Process. The results from Markov Chains can be used to demonstrate that:
PV [W W ] e u I
E (0)u(0) (C)
w1 The equation PV = f( /r, P , P ) (A) (as Fields mentions) simplyeu ue
projects today's new hire and lay-off rates into the future and would 
sufficiently reflect expectations of future employment probabilities. 
In here, W is wage and r is rate of interest. Equation (b) follows 
equation (A) .
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where,
We (Wu) I*'S t*ie wa^e one receives if he is employed, (unemployed)
I is the identity matrix
TP is the transpose of P
E(0) and U(0) are, respectively, one-zero variables denoting 
employment as unemployment at time zero.
If we suppose that U(0) = 1, E(0) = 0 (which means that
a new labourer (migrant) is unemployed initially), and he is ineligible 
for unemployment compensation, or (W = 0). Also, if we denote the wage 
while employed by W, equation (c) can be solved which gives an expected 
present value:
.'. PV = [ (1+r) /r] W [P /(r+p +P )] (D)ut ue eu
Fields argues that this probability estimation of future 
employment gives better results than the fairly widely used unemployment 
level. The main point to be made here is that some estimate of the 
probability of re-employment must be made otherwise the so-called 
"adjustment costs" for displaced labour will be greatly over-estimated.
5.5 Compensation for Displaced Labour
A third problem in Schmitz and Seckler's analysis concerns 
determination of the amount of compensation. The estimated wage loss 
from 1965 through 1972 has been compounded forward to 1973, and then 
they convert it to an annual flow. The conversion to an annual flow, 
which makes the calculation of the NSRR possible, assumes an infinite
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life for the displaced labour. This assumption, as they also believe, 
is "untenable". Another way of interpreting this over-estimation of 
compensation (which results in under-estimation of the value of NSRR), 
is in terms of the probability of finding a job and that probability 
should be taken into account due to the fact that the displaced workers 
will not be jobless for ever. This issue has been discussed to some 
extent in the previous section.
A more general part of the problem is that if society feels 
that is wants to get into the business, of compensating people for change, 
then the feasibility of a general compensation policy to insure the 
losers from economic progress should be questioned on practical and 
theoretical grounds. This is the question Pasour (1973) explored.
Should persons suffering from losses because of economic 
growth, including government intervention, be compensated by government? 
That is, would a program be feasible and capable of transferring enough 
of the gain by taxation of the gainers in the form of government pay­
ments to the losers such that they will not incur losses and be as well- 
off as they would have been before? Or, should we apply what Schmitz 
and Seckler say in this regard: "for compensation purposes, an alter­
native to unionization may be a form of state intervention in which a 
tax is imposed on units of output. The proceeds from this tax would 
then be used to finance retraining, relocative, and retirement programs"?
Pasour1s contention is that such programs would not be 
feasible. His arguments show "why a general policy of compensation to 
insure against losses associated with economic progress is not
appropriate".
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First, let us review some proposals for compensation in 
agriculture, then return to Pasour's arguments. Heady (1966) states: 
"Consumers reap a gain from the further contribution of farming to 
economic progress, but farmers in general have a sacrifice in the form 
of depressed incomes". In fact, he points out that government develop­
ment policies in agriculture, e.g. research, education and the like, 
lead to increases in agricultural output, which benefit consumers 
through lower food prices, but lead to reduced farm receipts because 
of the inelastic demand for farm products. So, he favours "Compensation 
policies to provide faimers with some payoff for this contribution to 
the national welfare" (1967). But he does not clearly discuss the 
compensation problem in general, i.e. whether or not he is in favour 
of a full or partial compensation policy for individuals in all sectors 
of the economy unfavourably influenced by government action and/or 
economic g rowth.^
T.W. Schultz (1961) proposes a general compensation policy. 
Ideally, the purpose of this policy is to ensure in principle that 
labourers and owners of resources would not be made worse off (or will 
not suffer losses) as a consequence of economic progress. He challenges 
the view that gains and losses are both necessary to induce adjustments 
by labour and other resources. Alternatively, Schultz contends that 
the incentives in a market economy can be retained by giving free reign 
to the unexpected gains while compensating for producers' losses because
1 According to Pasour, "full compensation is necessary to insure
against loss. Payment of partial compensation based on individual 
losses is subject to the same measurement problems as full compensa­
tion, however, since full compensation must be known before partial 
compensation can be determined".
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of economic progress. He assumes that the losses are much smaller than 
the gains, and, for this reason, that the net gains from economic 
progress are large enough to provide an effective system of incentives.
Heady, on the other hand, compares the gains to consumers 
with the losses to food producers associated with government development 
policies and says that "we cannot be certain that the sum outcome is 
positive". Heady suggests that adoption of a set of compensation 
policies to insure that the "sum outcome is positive" could well be an 
alternative in this regard.
Finally, Schmitz and Seckler's proposal is that a fraction 
of the economies generated by technological innovations be allocated 
out of general taxes to boost the displaced workers' mobility.
According to Pasour, "interventions of this sort would allow 
social costs and benefits to fall more or less randomly on the popula­
tion as a whole and thus, in a sense, cancel each other. If this were 
to occur, 'every-one' would be better off with technological change".
I quite agree with Pasour that the extent to which Schmitz and Seckler 
support compensation to insure against loss is not clear. However, as 
Pasour points out, the quote suggests that from a social welfare view 
point, all technological change should meet the "Pareto better" welfare 
criterion.
Pasour argues that a policy of compensation to insure 
against losses confronts us with four problems as follows:
(1) Measurement Problems
We are often not able to measure losses which are associated 
with economic growth. For instance, how can we separate losses (or
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reduction in prices) associated with economic growth from other losses 
(or reduction in prices)? Or, how we can determine the extent of the 
loss suffered by an individual? Pasour points out how immense would be 
the administrative problems in determining and measuring particular 
losses occurring because of economic progress. For this reason, 
"measurement problems alone are sufficiently formidable to limit the 
feasibility of any program to insure against such losses".
(2) Public Choice Process
A general system of compensation to balance the direct and 
indirect losses resulting from government activity is not feasible because 
it would be contradictory with the role of government of "enhancing" 
various self-interests at the expense of other people. Obviously, in 
every action taken by government, some people may gain and some people 
may lose, but the important point is that specific groups of citizens 
use the power of the state to "enhance" their own economic interests 
compared with economic interests of other groups.^ Pasour takes as 
examples in the U.S., agricultural subsidies, use-value property taxation 
for farmers, a ban on the use of DDT, and the zoning of farmland.
These examples represent choices made by government which are influ­
enced by specific groups who virtually misuse government for the 
advancement of their own interests.
(3) A third reason why a general compensation policy is not feasible 
depends "on the fact that governmental choice is also required in
1 "This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that certain 
groups might be sufficiently influential to obtain compensation 
for actions taken which are deleterious to their interests."
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determining and adjudicating property rights between individuals in 
the private sector where externalities are involved".
Pasour refers to Samuels (1971) in citing a Virginia case 
of 40 years' dispute in court as an example for his third reason: 
the story is about the property rights of cedar tree producers as against 
the rights of apple producers whose apples were being damaged by a cedar 
tree rust. This rust does not cause any damage to cedar trees, but its 
life cycle involves an attacking phase on apple leaves and fruits.
This example shows, firstly, how government was forced to choose between 
the interests of the two groups; and, secondly, that government in 
general is an "instrument" for the accommodation of conflicting interests.
(4) Risk and Moral Hazard
There are two kinds of risks: (a) those which can be pooled
(the aggregate risk is less than the combined risk), i.e. house-burning.
In such a case, a private insurance company provides a useful function.
(b) Those which are not poolable (the individual events which combine 
to form the aggregates are not independent of one another), i.e. when 
the society changes its demand for skill.
Pasour points out that "moral hazard refers to the fact 
that an insurance policy might have a deterrent effect on self- 
protection (i.e. acts which reduce the probability of a loss) which 
increases the probability of a hazardous event actually occurring".
The significance of moral hazard to the compensation issue 
is that Schultz (1961) contends that gains which are associated with
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economic growth are much larger than losses within the present 
institutional framework. Nevertheless, Pasour believes that a 
compensation rule would represent a pronounced institutional change. 
Within this proposed institutional framework, we are likely to 
increase risky and improper investments since we are always expecting 
non-positive losses.
The above shows that a general policy of compensation 
to insure farmers against losses, because of economic progress, does 
not seem to be "sound" either in practice or in theory.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
This thesis has been concerned with bringing together 
research which has taken place over the past two decades stemming 
from the work of Griliches (1958) on evaluating the benefits to 
research. The writings surveyed have followed pretty closely a 
natural progression, where first the total social gains were measured; 
then the allocation of the gains between consumers and producers were 
evaluated; and most recently, concentrated on the allocation of the 
gains among the several factors of production.
Duncan and Tsidell (1971) have explored the implications 
of different assumptions about the nature of the shift in the supply 
curve for the distribution of research benefits between consumers and 
producers. The size of total benefits accruing from a research inno­
vation will vary according to the type of shift in the supply curve 
(under the assumptions of a linear supply and demand schedule).
Three types of shifts are considered in addition to a parallel shift- 
pivoted, proportional and convergetn. Besides altering the total level 
of benefits, the type of shift will also influence the distribution of 
benefits between producers and consumers. Relative to a parallel 
shift, producers will gain more with a convergent shift and less with 
a pivoted or proportional shift, and vice versa for consumers.
One of the most important points for concern in this area 
of research is the concentration on measuring productivity gains through
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shifts in the supply curve. Wisecarver has demonstrated that, except 
in the special case of fixed proportions, this technique will understate 
the gains, and that the input-demand technique gives the proper framework. 
In the case of variable input proportions, output supply analysis omits 
the loss (gain) in welfare due to substitution of inputs in production.
The substitution effect, corresponding to the efficiency in production 
gain is obviously a welfare gain.
However, even among those workers using the supply-shift 
technique there has, as Scobie (1976) pointed out, been little attention 
to the results which may come from different specifications of the 
supply and demand curves and the formulae for consumers' and producers' 
surplus derived from them.
Scobie showed that the different formulations used give 
different, even contradictory, results. (It would be extremely diffi­
cult to reconcile the different mathematical approaches used by 
different authors.) However, inspection shows that, other than the 
difference in elasticity formulation mentioned above, the other major 
differences in approach between the several authors are in the specifi­
cation of the shift of the supply curve and the different initial con­
ditions adopted. It is not obvious (for that reason) that the 
different formulations should be questioned or condemned because they 
give different and often contradictory results. The right question is 
what is the appropriate supply and demand specification for the problem 
at hand? There is an obvious necessity for standardisation of mathe­
matical approaches to the specification of the formulae. These same 
comments would apply when the input-demand approach to the measurement
of gains is used.
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The important point which emerges from the recent studies 
on the allocation of the gains between consumers and producers is that 
the conventional wisdom does not apply universally. It has been argued 
previously, mainly by reference to the situation in the U.S. market, 
that consumers are the primary beneficiaries of agricultural research 
and producers gain little. However, in countries where it is appro­
priate to make the "small country" assumption about exports of 
agricultural products, producers are shown to be the major gainers.
The study by Schmitz and Seckler on the distribution of 
producers' surplus among factors, in which they primarily concentrated 
on the returns to labour, was shown to be subject to critical comment 
on important parts of the study. The major area for further work in 
this kind of study concerns the estimation of the adjustment costs 
imposed on labour by technological change. It was argued that Schmitz 
and Seckler had taken a very extreme and simplistic view of this central 
part of their study.
Schmitz and Seckler estimated the amount of compensation 
needed to make labour as well-off as previously on the basis of a fixed, 
institutionally fixed wage. This assumption involves a number of other 
unreasonable assumptions: that labour is automatically rendered un­
employed by labour-displacing innovations. It was argued that it is 
reasonable to expect that new forms of employment will be created in 
those industries and that firms will train displaced labour for these 
positions.
Rather than calculating compensation on the basis of the
unemployed forever remaining unemployed, it was suggested that the
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problem should be looked at in terms of labours' expected life-time 
earnings; taking into account the likely occurrence of workers changing 
jobs several times during their working life - involving with each 
change the possibility of different incomes being earned.
Finally, it should be pointed out that this whole area of 
work has implications for other areas of economic analysis - particularly 
in the area of industry protection. In this area the same problems of 
the distribution of gains (losses) between producers and consumers 
arise. So the same techniques should be applicable.
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